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Introduction 
This Article addresses a question that seems like it would be easy 
to answer, but is actually quite complex—when is an indigent defendant 
entitled to counsel at the public’s expense in the United States? The 
answer is complex because it depends on what the indigent is charged 
with, what sentence he receives, and who prosecutes him. The Sixth 
Amendment guarantees an accused the assistance of counsel in “all 
criminal prosecutions.”1 The Supreme Court has said that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance 
of counsel, and the right to appointed counsel at public expense for 
indigent defendants.2 But the Supreme Court has also said that the 
right to appointed counsel for indigents does not extend to “all criminal 
prosecutions,” just prosecutions for felonies and prosecutions for 
misdemeanors for which a trial court imposes a sentence of incar-
ceration or a suspended sentence of incarceration.3 Thus, even if a 
charging statute authorizes incarceration as a punishment, an indigent 
charged with a misdemeanor is not constitutionally entitled to 
appointed counsel unless the conviction actually results in a sentence 
of incarceration or a suspended sentence of incarceration. 
Who prosecutes the indigent matters because courts in different 
jurisdictions are subject to different rules. Both state and federal courts, 
of course, must meet the federal constitutional standard for appoint-
ment of counsel, but federal statutory law is more generous than the 
Constitution in providing appointed counsel to indigents in federal 
court. The Constitution does not apply in Indian country.4 The right 
to appointed counsel in tribal court, therefore, is governed by tribal 
code and federal law, not the federal constitutional standard. 
The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) is the federal statute that lays 
down the minimum procedural guarantees tribal courts must extend to 
defendants, much as the U.S. Constitution sets the floor in state and 
 
1. U.S. Const. amend VI. 
2. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932) (establishing the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel as a fundamental right); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335, 344–45 (1963) (holding that indigent defendants have a constitutional 
right to counsel provided by the government). 
3. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462–63 (1938) (holding that, absent a 
waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense unless he received 
representation by counsel at trial); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 
(1972) (“[A]bsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be im-
prisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, 
unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.”). 
4.  See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) (stating that the 
Cherokee Nation’s relationship with the United States is more akin to a 
“domestic dependent nation[]”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 2·2016 
VAWA 2013's Right to Appointed Counsel in Tribal Court Proceedings 
381 
federal court prosecutions.5 ICRA provides for a different right to 
appointed counsel than the Sixth Amendment for some tribal court 
defendants depending on the crime charged, whether the crime carries 
a term of imprisonment and, if it does, how long that term is. Tribal 
courts have plenary criminal jurisdiction over Indians6 who commit 
crimes in Indian country. Under ICRA’s general provisions, which only 
apply to Indian defendants, a tribal court does not need to provide 
indigent defendants with counsel at tribal expense when it imposes a 
sentence of incarceration of one year or less on that defendant.7 Under 
amendments to ICRA made by the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, 
a tribal court cannot impose a sentence of incarceration over one year 
unless the defendant is provided effective assistance of counsel, as 
defined by the federal constitution, and, if indigent, a licensed attorney 
at tribal expense.8 
Federal law does not recognize tribal courts’ criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians who commit crimes in Indian country except in very 
limited circumstances—under amendments to ICRA made by the 
Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization of 2013 (VAWA 2013), 
tribes can only prosecute non-Indians who have some connection to the 
reservation community for certain domestic violence offenses committed 
in Indian country against an Indian victim.9 To exercise this limited 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians under VAWA 2013, tribes must 
ensure that VAWA 2013 defendants are provided with effective 
 
5.  Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 202, 82 Stat. 73, 77 
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2012)). 
6. The term “Indian” has multiple definitions in federal law. This Article uses 
the term “Indian” to refer to a Native American subject to federal criminal 
jurisdiction. See U.S Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorneys’ Manual § 686 
(1997) (“To be considered an Indian, one generally has to have both ‘a 
significant degree of blood and sufficient connection to his tribe to be 
regarded [by the tribe or the government] as one of its members for criminal 
jurisdiction purposes.’ A threshold test, however, is whether the tribe with 
which affiliation is asserted is a federally acknowledged tribe.”); but see 
United States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) 
(holding that an element of an Indian Major Crimes Act offense is proof that 
defendant has “Indian blood,” whether or not that blood tie is to a federally 
recognized tribe) (citations omitted).  
7.  See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (2012) (establishing the obligation of tribal govern-
ments to provide indigent defendants with counsel only for crimes that 
impose a term of imprisonment of more than one year). Individual tribes, of 
course, may (and often do) have broader requirements for indigent defense 
counsel under their own laws than that required under federal law. 
8.  Pub. L. No. 11-211, § 234(c), 124 Stat. 2258, 2280 (2010) (current version at 
25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)). 
9.  25 U.S.C. § 1304(c) (Supp. I 2013–2014). 
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assistance of bar-licensed counsel;10 and, if a defendant is indigent, they 
must also provide that counsel at tribal expense if a term of impris-
onment of any length may be imposed.11 
Thus, in non-VAWA 2013 tribal court prosecutions (limited, by 
statute, to prosecutions against Indian defendants), under federal law 
a tribal court need only provide an indigent defendant with appointed 
counsel if it imposes a sentence of a year or more. In contrast, under 
Sixth Amendment case law, indigent federal and state court defendants 
cannot be incarcerated for any length of time if they have not been 
provided counsel at public expense.12 In VAWA 2013 tribal court 
prosecutions (the only criminal prosecutions that can be brought 
against a non-Indian by tribal authorities for crimes committed in 
Indian country), a tribal court must provide appointed counsel to in-
digent defendants who are exposed to a term of incarceration of any 
length.13 In contrast, indigent state and federal court defendants are 
not constitutionally entitled to appointed counsel for misdemeanors 
unless they are actually incarcerated, as opposed to exposed to 
incarceration.14 
ICRA’s tiered right to appointed counsel provisions can only be 
fully appreciated against the backdrop of two major bodies of law. The 
first is the Supreme Court’s long slog towards its current concep-
tualization of the constitutional right of poor criminal defendants to 
counsel at public expense in state criminal prosecutions. The second is 
Congress’ and the federal courts’ tortured journey towards the current 
status of tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians. Part I of this Article 
explains how the Supreme Court arrived at a constitutional rule that 
requires state trial courts to provide counsel at public expense to poor 
defendants in all felony cases, but not in misdemeanor cases unless the 
defendant is actually incarcerated for the offense. Part II offers an 
explanation of how the federal constitutional right to appointed counsel 
became so convoluted. Part III examines the various right to counsel 
provisions in ICRA and analyzes how they do, or do not, track the 
federal constitutional right to appointed counsel. Part IV asks what 
Congress has done. Did Congress really create a right to appointed 
counsel for the benefit of non-Indian tribal court defendants superior to 
that required by the Constitution in state and federal courts? Or did it 
 
10.  25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(2). 
11.  Id. § 1302(c)(2). 
12.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) (holding that indigent 
defendants have a constitutional right to counsel provided by the government). 
13.  § 1304(d)(2). 
14.  See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37–38 (1972) (explaining that the 
federal constitutional assistance of counsel requirement is triggered in cases 
where “imprisonment actually occurs”). 
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mean to create a right to appointed counsel under VAWA 2013 that is 
co-extensive with the Sixth Amendment? 
This Article concludes, reluctantly, that Congress did indeed create 
a more robust right to appointed counsel in tribal court under VAWA 
2013 than that required by the Constitution in state and federal court, 
and one greater than that enjoyed by Indian defendants in tribal court. 
It is a reluctant conclusion because, if Congress did in fact create a 
right to appointed counsel under VAWA 2013 beyond that required by 
the Constitution in state and federal courts and beyond that required 
for Indian defendants in tribal courts, it could be interpreted as a deter-
mination that non-Indian defendants need more procedural protection 
in tribal court than they would be constitutionally entitled to if they 
were tried in state or federal court to ensure a fair proceeding. Absent 
some proof that tribal courts are any less capable than state or federal 
courts in dealing fairly with indigent defendants, Congress’ differential 
and preferential treatment of indigent VAWA 2013 defendants, this 
Article submits, is indefensible because it results in an unwarranted 
procedural windfall for non-Indian tribal court defendants. 
I. Federal Constitutional Right to Counsel at 
Public Expense 
A. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel 
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel 
for his defence.”15 The Sixth Amendment has always been understood 
to guarantee federal court defendants the assistance of counsel in 
criminal proceedings unless the right is waived.16 The Supreme Court 
eventually extended this right to state court defendants under the Four-
teenth Amendment.17 The primary Sixth Amendment constitutional 
question, thus, is not whether a defendant is entitled to have counsel 
present to aid in his defense in a criminal prosecution, but rather whe-
ther and when the government must provide counsel to indigent defen-
dants to ensure they are not deprived of assistance of counsel because 
they cannot afford to pay for an attorney. The Supreme Court, of 
course, answered this question in 1963 in Gideon v. Wainright, where 
it held that the Sixth Amendment requires courts to provide counsel at 
 
15. U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
16. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (“The Sixth Amendment 
withholds from federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and 
authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives 
the assistance of counsel.”) (citations omitted). 
17. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963). 
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public expense to poor people prosecuted with serious offenses.18 In a 
federal system in which most crimes are prosecuted on the state level 
and most defendants prosecuted by the states are poor, this holding 
had (and continues to have) substantial resource implications for 
states.19 
Indigent defendants in federal prosecutions have had the right to 
appointed counsel at public expense in federal felony cases since 1938,20 
in federal capital cases since 1940,21 and in federal non-petty mis-
demeanor cases since 1964.22 The primary federal statute governing 
appointment of counsel in federal court is the Criminal Justice Act 
 
18. See id. at 339 (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942)) (rejecting 
the proposition that denial of counsel at trial “is to be tested by an appraisal 
of the totality of facts in a given case”). 
19. See Lincoln Caplan, The Right to Counsel: Badly Battered at 50, N.Y. 
Times (Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/opinion/ 
sunday/the-right-to-counsel-badly-battered-at-50.html [https://perma.cc/ 
L9PL-NE3F] (“While the constitutional commitment [to provide appointed 
counsel to indigent defendants] is generally met in federal courts, it is a 
different story in state courts, which handle about 95 percent of America’s 
criminal cases. This matters because, by well-informed estimates, at least 
80 percent of state criminal defendants cannot afford to pay for lawyers and 
have to depend on court-appointed counsel.”). 
20. See Johnson, 304 U.S. at 462–63 (holding that the Sixth Amendment 
guarantees criminal defendants the right to retain counsel in federal court 
and requiring the federal government to appoint an attorney in felony cases 
if a defendant cannot afford one). 
21. See 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (2012) (providing for appointed counsel in federal 
capital cases). Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3005 in 1948 and amended it in 
1994. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 814; Violent Crime Control and 
Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103–322, § 60026, 108 Stat. 1796, 
1982. Its predecessor statute, 18 U.S.C. § 563, governed the matter before 
that; it was similar to the pre-1994 amendment version of 18 U.S.C. § 3005. 
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 563 (1946) (discussing counsel for capital crime 
indictees) with 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1988) (also discussing counsel for capital 
crime indictees); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(1) (2012) (“Notwithstanding 
any other provision of law to the contrary, in every criminal action in which 
a defendant is charged with a crime which may be punishable by death, a 
defendant who is or becomes financially unable to obtain adequate represen-
tation or investigative, expert, or other reasonably necessary services at any 
time either–(A) before judgment; or (B) after the entry of a judgment 
imposing a sentence of death but before the execution of that judgment; shall 
be entitled to the appointment of one or more attorneys . . . .”). 
22. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, enacted through the federal Criminal Justice Act of 1964 
(CJA), requires appointment of counsel for indigent federal defendants charged 
with felonies or Class A misdemeanors. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
Congress passed the CJA on the heels of the Court’s 1963 decision in Gideon 
v. Wainwright. Criminal Justice Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88–455, 78 Stat. 552. 
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(CJA).23 It requires appointment of counsel at public expense to in-
digent federal defendants in specific proceedings and under specific 
circumstances.24 And the CJA provides that the statutory entitlement 
to appointed counsel in federal cases is co-extensive with the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.25 Since Congress linked the statutory 
right to the constitutional right in federal court, issues concerning the 
constitutional entitlement to counsel at public expense will almost in-
variably arise in the context of challenges to state court, not federal 
court, convictions. As a result, most Sixth Amendment jurisprudence 
fixing the parameters of the right to counsel at public expense has 
 
23. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2012). 
24. The CJA requires federal district courts to “place in operation throughout 
the district a plan for furnishing representation for any person financially 
unable to obtain adequate representation in accordance with this section.” 
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a). The plan must cover “counsel and investigative, 
expert, and other services necessary for adequate representation” for any 
financial eligible defendant who—  
(A) is charged with a felony or a Class A misdemeanor; 
(B) is a juvenile alleged to have committed an act of juvenile delinquency 
as defined in section 5031 of this title; 
(C) is charged with a violation of probation; 
(D) is under arrest, when such representation is required by law; 
(E) is charged with a violation of supervised release or faces modification, 
reduction, or enlargement of a condition, or extension or revocation of a 
term of supervised release; 
(F) is subject to a mental condition hearing under chapter 313 of this 
title; 
(G) is in custody as a material witness; 
(H) is entitled to appointment of counsel under the sixth amendment to 
the Constitution; 
(I) faces loss of liberty in a case, and Federal law requires the 
appointment of counsel; or 
(J) is entitled to the appointment of counsel under section 4109 of this 
title [covering extradition to and from other countries]. 
 Id. See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 44(a) (stating defendant is entitled to 
appointed counsel from initial appearance through appeal unless waived). 
25. As noted above, under the CJA, federal district court indigent defense plans 
must provide counsel to any financially eligible person who “is entitled to 
appointment of counsel under the sixth amendment to the Constitution[.]” 18 
U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(1)(H) (2012). This catch-all provision essentially requires 
federal district courts to ensure that their district plans expand and contract 
with the U.S. Supreme Court’s evaluation of when an indigent is entitled to 
counsel at public expense without further statutory intervention by Congress. 
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evolved in the context of federal habeas review of state court convic-
tions. The law in this area, therefore, is best understood through a ha-
beas corpus federalism filter as a series of installments in the Supreme 
Court’s ongoing assessment of the extent to which the Fourteenth 
Amendment dictates or constrains the level of procedural protection 
that state courts must provide in criminal prosecutions. 
B. Actual v. Authorized Incarceration Trigger 
As explained below, the federal constitutional right to counsel at 
public expense applies only where a defendant is prosecuted for a felony, 
or is convicted of a misdemeanor for which the defendant receives a 
sentence of incarceration or a conditional sentence of incarceration. An 
indigent charged with a misdemeanor for which a term of imprisonment 
is authorized by the charging statute, but who does not actually receive 
a sentence of incarceration or conditional sentence of incarceration, has 
no federal constitutional right to counsel at public expense. As a prac-
tical matter, since the constitutional right to appointed counsel is tri-
ggered by actual or conditional incarceration, this requires state trial 
courts to either: (1) provide all indigent defendants who could face in-
carceration with counsel at public expense to preserve incarceration as 
a sentencing option, or (2) forgo incarceration as a sentencing option in 
individual cases altogether. 
Explaining how the Gideon right to appointed counsel came to 
incorporate an actual or conditional incarceration trigger for misde-
meanors requires understanding the Supreme Court jurisprudence 
leading up to it. The starting point for that discussion is Powell v. 
Alabama,26 decided thirty-one years before Gideon.27 In 1931, nine 
 
26. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
27. See Gabriel J. Chin, Race and the Disappointing Right to Counsel, 122 Yale 
L.J. 2236, 2243 (2013) (“The major pre-Gideon development in right-to-
counsel jurisprudence was Powell v. Alabama[.]”). 
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young black men28 were charged with raping two white teenage girls.29 
At the state’s request, the proceedings were severed; some defendants 
were tried in groups, others individually.30 On the morning of their re-
spective trials, which came less than a week after they were arraigned, 
and which lasted only one day, the defendants were appointed counsel.31 
Sort of. Rather than designate specific attorneys for each defendant, 
the trial court appointed members of the local bar, generally and 
collectively, to provide representation.32 
At the time in Alabama, the punishment for the crime of rape was 
determined by the jury and ranged from ten years’ incarceration to 
death.33 Eight of the nine Powell defendants were convicted and 
 
28. Alabama charged Ozie Powell, Willie Roberson, Andy Wright, Olen 
Montgomery, Eugene Williams, Charlie Weems, Clarence Norris, Haywood 
Patterson, and Roy Wright (Andy’s brother) and tried them in Scottsboro, 
Alabama, the Jackson County seat. These defendants became known as the 
“Scottsboro Boys.” See Alan Blinder, Alabama Pardons 3 ‘Scottsboro Boys’ 
After 80 Years, N.Y. Times (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2013/11/22/us/with-last-3-pardons-alabama-hopes-to-put-
infamous-scottsboro-boys-case-to-rest.html [https://perma.cc/M7KW-43CF] 
(discussing the story of the “Scottsboro Boys”). The defendants’ ages were 
not clear in the record, but they all appeared to be teenagers at the time of 
the offense. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 51–52 (“The record does not disclose 
their ages, except that one of them was nineteen; but the record clearly 
indicates that most, if not all, of them were youthful, and they are constantly 
referred to as ‘the boys.’”). 
29. Powell, 287 U.S. at 49. 
30. Powell, Roberson, Andy Wright, Montgomery, and Williams were tried 
together, Weems and Norris were tried together, and Patterson was tried 
alone. Powell v. State, 141 So. 201 (Ala. 1932); Weems v. State, 141 So. 215 
(Ala. 1932); Patterson v. State, 141 So. 195 (Ala. 1932). See also Powell, 287 
U.S. at 49 (noting the severance of the cases). 
31. Powell, 287 U.S. at 49–50 (“[U]pon the arraignment they were represented 
by counsel. But no counsel had been employed, and aside from a statement 
made by the trial judge several days later during a colloquy immediately 
preceding the trial, the record does not disclose when, or under what 
circumstances, an appointment of counsel was made, or who was 
appointed. . . . There was a severance upon the request of the state, and the 
defendants were tried in three several groups . . . Each of the three trials was 
completed within a single day.”). See also id. at 53 (noting that the trials 
began six days after indictment). 
32. Id. at 56 (“It thus will be seen that until the very morning of the trial no 
lawyer had been named or definitely designated to represent the defendants. 
Prior to that time, the trial judge had ‘appointed all the members of the bar’ 
for the limited ‘purpose of arraigning the defendants.’ Whether they would 
represent the defendants thereafter if no counsel appeared in their behalf, 
was a matter of speculation only, or, as the judge indicated, of mere 
anticipation on the part of the court.”). 
33. Id. at 50. 
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sentenced to death.34 The eight defendants appealed their convictions 
to the Supreme Court of Alabama, which upheld seven of the convic-
tions.35 The remaining seven defendants petitioned, and were granted 
certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, consolidated under the Powell 
matter.36 The Supreme Court reversed their convictions and remanded 
their cases for new trials, holding that the state trial court’s untimely 
and haphazard appointment of counsel violated the defendants’ federal 
constitutional right to due process.37 
Powell is one of the most significant events in the unfolding story 
of American legal federalism. Never before had the Court reversed a 
state criminal conviction under the Fourteenth Amendment due process 
clause based on the deprivation of a criminal procedure guarantee found 
in the federal Bill of Rights.38 Powell was momentous, but not all 
 
34. Powell, Roberson, Andy Wright, Montgomery, Williams, Weems, Patterson, 
and Norris were convicted and sentenced to death. Powell v. State, 141 So. 
201, 214 (Ala. 1932); Weems v. State, 141 So. 215, 221 (Ala. 1932). Roy 
Wright’s jury hung. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 74 (Butler, J., dissenting) (“Nine 
defendants including Patterson were accused in one indictment, and he was 
also separately indicted. . . . Weems and Norris were tried first. Patterson 
was tried next on the separate indictment. Then five were tried. These eight 
were found guilty. The other defendant, Roy Wright, was tried last and not 
convicted. The convicted defendants took the three cases to the state supreme 
court, where the judgment as to Williams was reversed and those against the 
seven petitioners were affirmed.”). 
35. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed Williams’ conviction because the 
state did not establish that Williams was at least sixteen years old at the 
time of the offense and thereby subject to the jurisdiction of the state trial 
court. Powell, 141 So. at 213. 
36. Powell v. Alabama, 286 U.S. 534, 540 (1932) (granting certiorari). 
37. Powell, 287 U.S. at 57 (“In any event, the circumstance lends emphasis to 
the conclusion that during perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings 
against these defendants, that is to say, from the time of their arraignment 
until the beginning of their trial, when consultation, thoroughgoing invest-
igation and preparation were vitally important, the defendants did not have 
the aid of counsel in any real sense, although they were as much entitled to 
such aid during that period as at the trial itself.”) (citations omitted). 
38. Before Powell, the Court had only reversed state criminal convictions under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment based on racial 
discrimination in jury selection procedure. See Michael J. Klarman, The 
Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 48, 65 
(2000) (stating how through 1934, the Court had barred race discrimination 
in jury selection). Two Justices dissented in Powell, noting that the majority 
had gone further than it needed to and, in so doing, encroached on the 
authority of the States. Powell, 287 U.S. at 76 (Butler, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
ruling that the failure of the trial court to give petitioners time and 
opportunity to secure counsel was denial of due process is enough, and with 
this the opinion should end. But the Court goes on to declare that ‘the failure 
of the trial court to make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a 
denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.’ 
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encompassing. Its holding, for example, did not require appointment of 
counsel for all indigent state court defendants, not even all state court 
defendants facing death sentences. Rather, the Court cabined its 
holding by tethering its due process analysis to a case-by-case, fact-
specific inquiry: 
[U]nder the circumstances39 . . . the necessity of counsel was so 
vital and imperative that the failure of the trial court to make an 
effective appointment of counsel was . . . a denial of due process 
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Whether this 
would be so in other criminal prosecutions, or under other 
circumstances, we need not determine. All that it is necessary 
now to decide, as we do decide, is that in a capital case, where 
the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable 
adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble 
mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, 
whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary 
requisite of due process of law; and that duty is not discharged 
by an assignment at such a time or under such circumstances as 
to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial 
of the case.40 
Powell, thus, established a facts and circumstances inquiry for federal 
constitutional right to appointed counsel claims. Under Powell, a state 
court defendant in a death penalty case who needed counsel, but who 
was not appointed counsel sufficiently in advance of trial to allow for 
effective assistance of counsel could, for the first time, challenge a state 
conviction as a violation of due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Six years later, in Johnson v. Zerbst,41 the Court extended the 
principle established in Powell to federal non-capital felony prose-
cutions.42 The Court decided Johnson under the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel provision, not the Fourteenth Amendment due process 
clause—which was the basis for the Powell decision—because Johnson 
 
This is an extension of federal authority into a field hitherto occupied 
exclusively by the several States.”).  
39. The “circumstances” recited by the Court in Powell were “the ignorance 
and illiteracy of the defendants, their youth, the circumstances of public 
hostility, the imprisonment and the close surveillance of the defendants by 
the military forces, the fact that their friends and families were all in other 
states and communication with them necessarily difficult, and above all that 
they stood in deadly peril of their lives . . . .” Powell, 287 U.S. at 71. 
40. Id. 
41. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
42. Id. at 463.  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 2·2016 
VAWA 2013's Right to Appointed Counsel in Tribal Court Proceedings 
390 
was a federal, not a state, prosecution.43 John Johnson and a com-
panion, Monroe Birdwell, were enlisted men in the U.S. Marine Corps.44 
They were charged with several federal felonies involving passing and 
possessing counterfeit twenty-dollar bills.45 Both men were detained 
pending indictment because they could not afford bail.46 Both were 
represented by counsel in preliminary hearings.47 Two months later, 
they were indicted, arraigned, tried, convicted, and sentenced to four 
and a half years in a federal penitentiary without the assistance of 
counsel.48 Like the Powell defendants, Johnson and his co-defendant 
were uneducated, poor, and far from home.49 
Johnson’s challenge to his conviction eventually ended up before 
the Supreme Court. Reviewing Johnson’s conviction, the Court inter-
preted the Sixth Amendment right to counsel guarantee as a mechanism 
for leveling the playing field between the defendant and the prosecution 
in federal criminal cases; the Sixth Amendment, it stated, “embodies a 
realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant 
does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when 
brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein 
the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned counsel.”50 
Under the Sixth Amendment, the Court held that federal courts lack 
“the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty 
unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel.”51 The Court, with 
two Justices dissenting, and one taking no part in the consideration of 
the case, remanded Johnson’s case to the district court to evaluate 
whether he had waived his right to assistance of counsel.52 
 
43. Id. at 459.  
44. Id. at 459–60. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 460. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. (“Both petitioners lived in distant cities of other states and neither had 
relatives, friends, or acquaintances in Charleston. Both had little education 
and were without funds.”) (citation omitted). 
50. Id. at 462–63. 
51. Id. at 463. The Johnson Court interpreted a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel as a jurisdictional defect—unless a criminal 
defendant validly waives the right to assistance of counsel, the Court held, 
the trial court’s failure to appoint counsel to a defendant facing the loss of 
life or liberty in federal court deprives it of jurisdiction and renders the 
conviction void. Id. at 467–68. 
52. The district court had dismissed Johnson’s habeas petition without making 
any findings on waiver because it concluded that the remedy was not 
available to Johnson. Id. at 469. On remand, the Court instructed the district 
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Four years later, in Betts v. Brady,53 the Court considered whether 
the Fourteenth Amendment requires appointment of counsel at public 
expense in all state court proceedings in which the Powell factors were 
met, or whether Powell was limited to state capital cases—i.e. whether 
a state court’s failure to provide counsel, whether requested or not, to 
a defendant “unable to employ counsel, and . . . incapable adequately 
of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, 
illiteracy, or the like”54 violates due process only in capital cases, or if 
the Fourteenth Amendment due process right to appointed counsel also 
reaches non-capital state court criminal prosecutions.55 
Smith Betts was indicted for robbery in a Maryland trial court.56 
He lacked money to hire an attorney and requested that the court ap-
point one for him.57 The trial court denied Betts’s request, explaining 
that the county only provided counsel at public expense to indigent 
defendants charged with murder or rape.58 Without waiving the right 
to counsel, Betts pleaded not guilty and proceeded to a bench trial.59 
At the bench trial, witnesses were summoned for him, he examined 
witnesses, and he was given the opportunity to testify on his own be-
half.60 The trial court found Betts guilty and sentenced him to eight 
years in prison.61 
Betts challenged his conviction on Fourteenth Amendment 
grounds, asserting that the trial court’s refusal to appoint counsel de-
prived him of “liberty without due process of law.”62 Betts sought a 
categorical ruling from the Court requiring state courts to appoint 
counsel to indigent defendants as a matter of federal constitutional law 
in all criminal cases.63 In addressing Betts’s claim, the Court discussed 
 
court to grant the writ if Johnson established that he had not competently 
and intelligently waived the right to counsel, and to deny the writ if he did 
not sustain that burden. Id. 
53. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 
(1963). 
54. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
55. Betts, 316 U.S. at 461.  
56. Id. at 456. 
57. Id. at 456–57.  
58. Id. at 457. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 461. 
63. Id. at 462. (“The petitioner, in this instance, asks us, in effect, to apply a 
rule in the enforcement of the due process clause. He says the rule to be 
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the relationship between the right to counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment—which only applies in federal court and which, at this 
juncture, had not been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment—
on one hand, and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
on the other.64 The Court explained that although the specific guar-
antees in the Sixth Amendment were not, at this time, incorporated 
into the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, a state’s denial 
of rights and privileges set out in the first eight amendments to the 
Constitution could, in some circumstances, result in a denial of due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment.65 
The difference between the guarantees under the Bill of Rights and 
the protections afforded by the due process right, the Court explained, 
is that the latter is “less rigid and more fluid” than the former.66 As 
such, evaluating a claim of a constitutional violation under due process 
is “less a matter of rule,” and is “tested by an appraisal of the totality 
of facts in a given case.”67 Thus, what may amount to a denial of due 
process under one set of facts, under other facts may not.68 Relying on 
an originalist and historical analysis, a divided Court rejected Betts’s 
argument that a right to counsel at public expense in all state criminal 
proceedings was “dictated by natural, inherent, and fundamental prin-
ciples of fairness.”69 Rather than a fundamental right essential to a fair 
trial, the Court concluded, in the great majority of the states at the 
 
deduced from our former decisions is that, in every case, whatever the cir-
cumstances, one charged with crime, who is unable to obtain counsel, must 
be furnished counsel by the State.”). 
64. Id. at 461–62. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 462. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 464–65 (“The question we are now to decide is whether due process of 
law demands that in every criminal case, whatever the circumstances, a State 
must furnish counsel to an indigent defendant. Is the furnishing of counsel in 
all cases whatever dictated by natural, inherent, and fundamental principles 
of fairness? . . . Though, as we have noted, the [Sixth] Amendment lays down 
no rule for the conduct of the States, the question recurs whether the 
constraint laid by the [Sixth] Amendment upon the national courts expresses 
a rule so fundamental and essential to a fair trial, and so, to due process of 
law, that it is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Relevant data on the subject are afforded by constitutional and 
statutory provisions subsisting in the colonies and the States prior to the 
inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the national Constitution, and in the 
constitutional, legislative, and judicial history of the States to the present 
date. These constitute the most authoritative sources for ascertaining the 
considered judgment of the citizens of the States upon the question.”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 2·2016 
VAWA 2013's Right to Appointed Counsel in Tribal Court Proceedings 
393 
founding, the appointment of counsel was a legislative, not a consti-
tutional, matter.70 
Having rejected Betts’s argument that the Fourteenth Amendment 
supported a categorical approach to the right to appointed counsel in 
state court proceedings, the majority analyzed Betts’s claim under the 
totality of the circumstances.71 Betts’s conviction, the majority noted, 
followed a bench trial, which, the record showed, was much more in-
formal that a jury trial in Maryland.72 Further, there was no question 
that the charged crime had occurred—the issue was whether Betts was 
the perpetrator, an accusation Betts defended with an alibi.73 To defend 
his case, Betts was permitted to call and examine witnesses, which, 
according to the majority, reduced the trial to the “simple issue [of] the 
veracity of the testimony for the State and that for the Defendant.”74 
Relying on the trial judge’s observations in the record, the majority 
noted that Betts was “not helpless, but was a man forty-three years 
old, of ordinary intelligence, and ability to take care of his own interests 
on the trial of that narrow issue,” and who had prior experience with 
the criminal justice system as a criminal defendant.75 Finally, the ma-
jority noted that under Maryland law, Betts would have been entitled 
to appointed counsel had a judge determined he was incapable of 
protecting his interests.76 
The Betts majority’s rejection of a categorical rule requiring states 
to appoint counsel in all criminal trials, regardless of the seriousness of 
the offense, reflects the federalism concerns that, explicitly or implicitly, 
inform the Court’s incorporation jurisprudence in the criminal justice 
context generally—namely the far-reaching implications of imposing a 
federal constitutional rule of criminal procedure (and its attendant 
 
70. Id. at 471–72 (“[I]n the great majority of the States, it has been the 
considered judgment of the people, their representatives and their courts that 
appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial. 
On the contrary, the matter has generally been deemed one of legislative 
policy. In the light of this evidence, we are unable to say that the concept of 
due process incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the States, 
whatever may be their own views, to furnish counsel in every such case. 
Every court has power, if it deems proper, to appoint counsel where that 
course seems to be required in the interest of fairness.”). 
71. Id. at 471–73. 
72. Id. at 472. 
73. Id. 
74. Id.  
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 472–73 (“It is quite clear that in Maryland, if the situation had been 
otherwise and it had appeared that the petitioner was, for any reason, at a 
serious disadvantage by reason of the lack of counsel, a refusal to appoint 
would have resulted in the reversal of a judgment of conviction.”). 
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costs) on states in a system in which most crime is prosecuted at the 
state and local level. The result Betts sought, the majority noted, would 
impose upon states a “requirement without distinction between criminal 
charges of different magnitude or in respect of courts of varying 
jurisdiction” requiring appointment of counsel in small crimes and even 
traffic court.77 Indeed, the majority asserted, because the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects property as well as life and liberty, taken to its 
logical end, Betts’s argument would require appointment of counsel 
even in civil cases involving property.78 
Following Betts, the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause re-
quired state courts to provide counsel at public expense where the 
absence of counsel may result in a trial “offensive to the common and 
fundamental ideas of fairness and right.”79 The Fourteenth Amendment 
due process clause, the Court held, simply could not be interpreted to 
mean that state court criminal defendants can never obtain fair and 
just results in any state court criminal proceedings without the assis-
tance of counsel.80 Under Betts, therefore, state court defendants had a 
federal constitutional right to appointed counsel in non-capital cases 
subject to Powell’s facts and circumstances test. Or, stated in the neg-
ative, absent special circumstances like illiteracy or a complex trial, 
state courts were not constitutionally required to provide counsel at 
public expense to indigent defendants. 
Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy dissented in Betts.81 They 
disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment did not incorporate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. And 
they took issue with the majority’s conclusion that a failure to appoint 
counsel in Betts’s case did not violate his right to due process.82 Both 
 
77. Betts, 316 U.S. at 473 (quoting the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, the majority asserted that such a ruling would require 
appointment of counsel for “‘[c]harges of small crimes tried before justices of 
the peace and capital charges tried in the higher courts . . . . Presumably it 
would be argued that trials in the Traffic Court would require it.’”). 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. (explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment does not embody an 
“inexorable command that no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be 
fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by 
counsel”). 
81. Id. at 474 (Black, J., dissenting). 
82. Id. at 474–75 (Black, J., dissenting) (“If this case had come to us from a 
federal court, it is clear we should have to reverse it, because the Sixth 
Amendment makes the right to counsel in criminal cases inviolable by the 
Federal Government. I believe that the Fourteenth Amendment made the 
Sixth applicable to the states. But this view, although often urged in dissents, 
has never been accepted by a majority of this Court and is not accepted today. 
. . . I believe, however, that under the prevailing view of due process, as 
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were points, as it turned out in subsequent cases, on which the Betts 
dissenters would prove to have the better of the argument. 
In 1961, in Hamilton v. Alabama,83 almost two decades after Betts 
and two years before Gideon, the Court re-visited the issue of the 
federal constitutional test for determining when a state court must 
appoint counsel to indigent defendants in death penalty cases. As noted, 
Powell established a case-by-case facts and circumstances test.84 The 
question in Hamilton was whether a state court capital defendant had 
a constitutional right to counsel at all critical stages of prosecution, 
regardless of whether he was prejudiced by the absence of counsel.85 
Stated another way, whether appointment of counsel in state death 
penalty proceedings was a categorical federal constitutional re-
quirement. Or, whether, as the Court held in Powell, the right is subject 
to a case-by-case inquiry. The Hamilton Court, in a very short and 
unanimous opinion, held that assistance of counsel is constitutionally 
and categorially required at all critical stages of a state death penalty 
prosecution: “[w]hen one pleads to a capital charge without benefit of 
counsel,” the Court held, “we do not stop to determine whether 
prejudice resulted.”86 In so holding, the Hamilton Court effectively 
abandoned Powell’s case-by-case approach for evaluating the federal 
constitutional right to counsel in state death penalty cases. 
At this juncture, which is shortly before the Court decided Gideon, 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence categorically required assistance 
of counsel at all critical stages of state capital cases.87 But it didn’t 
always require appointment of counsel at public expense in non-capital 
cases, as those were still subject to the Betts case-by-case, facts, and 
circumstances inquiry.88 And that was the issue in Gideon—whether 
the Court should continue to adhere to a case-by-case approach to the 
right to appointed counsel in state non-capital cases. Or whether it 
should extend the categorical approach it had just adopted for state 
 
reflected in the opinion just announced, a view which gives this Court such 
vast supervisory powers that I am not prepared to accept it without grave 
doubts, the judgment below should be reversed.”) (citation omitted). 
83. 368 U.S. 52 (1961). 
84. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932). 
85. Hamilton, 368 U.S. at 53. 
86. Id. at 55. Hamilton was arraigned and entered a plea at his arraignment 
without the assistance of counsel. Id. at 52. On review, it was conceded that 
arraignment was a critical proceeding under Alabama law. Id. at 53–54. 
87. Id. at 54–55. 
88. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471–72 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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capital cases in Hamilton to state non-capital cases.89 Gideon, of course, 
overruled Betts, holding that, at least in felony cases, states must pro-
vide indigent defendants with counsel at public expense.90 
Gideon produced a unanimous opinion with a clear holding, but 
elusive reasoning. Justice Black, the reader will recall, was one of three 
dissenters in Betts. He disagreed both with the Betts majority’s 
conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the majority’s conclusion that 
a failure to appoint counsel in Betts’s case did not violate his right to 
due process.91 Now writing for the majority in Gideon, Justice Black 
offered two reasons for overruling Betts. One, Betts represented a de-
parture from precedent—Justice Black characterized Betts’s position on 
incorporation (that is, whether appointment of counsel is a fundamental 
right incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment) as an “abrupt 
break with [the Court’s] own well-considered precedents.”92 According 
to Justice Black, the Gideon Court was simply “returning to these old 
precedents, sounder we believe than the new,” and restoring “constitu-
tional principles established to achieve a fair system of justice.”93 The 
second rationale Justice Black offered was that Betts was wrongly 
decided because it was contrary to obvious truth—“[n]ot only these 
precedents but also reason and reflection require us to recognize that in 
our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, 
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless 
counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth.”94 
Neither reason is entirely satisfying. Fairly read, Betts was a logical 
and natural application of Powell’s case-by-case analysis in the non-
capital context.95 And Justice Black’s second rationale—that Betts 
 
89. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337–38 (“Since 1942, when Betts v. Brady was decided 
by a divided Court, the problem of a defendant’s federal constitutional right 
to counsel in a state court has been a continuing source of controversy and 
litigation in both state and federal courts. To give this problem another review 
here, we granted certiorari.”) (citations omitted). 
90. Id. at 342. 
91. Betts, 316 U.S. at 474 (Black, J., dissenting). 
92. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. This “obvious truth” language is found in the Johnson opinion, where the 
court held that the outcome there “embodie[d] a realistic recognition of the 
obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal 
skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his 
life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned 
counsel.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462–63 (1938). 
95. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 349–50 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I agree that Betts 
v. Brady should be overruled, but consider it entitled to a more respectful 
burial than has been accorded, at least on the part of those of us who were 
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should be overturned because its result is contrary to “obvious truth”—
is a debatable, if not alarming, basis for overturning an established 
Supreme Court precedent. Although Gideon presents a compelling re-
sult as a matter of justice and fair play, faithfulness to the rule of law 
ostensibly requires high courts to follow prior case law until it is shown 
to be contrary to positive law or based on faulty factual premise, not 
simply because a different set of jurists later concludes it is contrary to 
an “obvious truth.” This should be particularly so when the result of a 
federal court ruling forces states to standardize their criminal justice 
procedures around a newly recognized federal constitutional right.96 
Gideon involved a state felony conviction and it imposed a cate-
gorical requirement under the Sixth Amendment, applied to the states 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, to provide indigent defendants 
charged with felonies counsel at public expense.97 The next issue pre-
sented was whether the Constitution imposed the same requirement in 
misdemeanor cases. And, if it did, was the requirement a categorical 
 
not on the Court when that case was decided. I cannot subscribe to the view 
that Betts v. Brady represented ‘an abrupt break with its own well-considered 
precedents.’ In 1932, in Powell v. Alabama, a capital case, this Court declared 
that under the particular facts there presented . . . the state court had a duty 
to assign counsel for the trial as a necessary requisite of due process of law. It 
is evident that these limiting facts were not added to the opinion as an 
afterthought; they were repeatedly emphasized, and were clearly regarded as 
important to the result. Thus when this Court, a decade later, decided Betts 
v. Brady, it did no more than to admit of the possible existence of special 
circumstances in noncapital as well as capital trials, while at the same time 
insisting that such circumstances be shown in order to establish a denial of 
due process.”) (citations omitted). 
96. In his concurrence, Justice Harlan offered a different take on whether 
categorical rules threaten state autonomy more than case-by-case inquiries—
he thought that Gideon’s categorical holding was probably more aligned with 
federalism concerns than Betts because Betts’s case-by-case approach had 
resulted in significant federal court oversight over state court criminal 
proceedings. Id. at 350–51 (“In noncapital cases, the ‘special circumstances’ 
rule has continued to exist in form while its substance has been substantially 
and steadily eroded.” Noting that no decision since 1950 had found a lack of 
special circumstances and that “there have been not a few cases in which 
special circumstances were found in little or nothing more than the 
‘complexity’ of the legal questions presented, although those questions were 
often of only routine difficulty. The Court has come to recognize, in other 
words, that the mere existence of a serious criminal charge constituted in 
itself special circumstances requiring the services of counsel at trial. In truth 
the Betts v. Brady rule is no longer a reality. This evolution, however, appears 
not to have been fully recognized by many state courts, in this instance 
charged with the front-line responsibility for the enforcement of 
constitutional rights. To continue a rule which is honored by this Court only 
with lip service is not a healthy thing and in the long run will do disservice 
to the federal system.”) (citations omitted). 
97. Id. at 342. 
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constitutional imperative, like the rule in Gideon? Or would it be de-
termined on a case-by-case basis, the approach the Court initially 
embraced in Powell for state capital cases, but later abandoned in 
Hamilton, and initially adopted in Betts, but later abandoned in 
Gideon?  
This was the issue in Argersinger v. Hamlin,98 decided in 1972, nine 
years after Gideon.99 Jon Richard Argersinger was charged with 
carrying a concealed weapon in violation of Florida law.100 At the time, 
the offense was punishable by up to six months in jail and a fine of up 
to $1000.101 Argersinger was indigent and was not appointed counsel.102 
Following a bench trial, the trial court sentenced him to ninety days 
incarceration.103 He appealed his conviction on the ground that he had 
been deprived his federal constitutional right to counsel.104 The Florida 
Supreme Court, in a closely divided opinion, held that Argersinger was 
not entitled to counsel at public expense.105 The Court held that the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel was co-extensive with the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial,106 a right the U.S. Supreme Court had 
recently extended to some, but not all, state court criminal proceedings 
in Duncan v. Louisiana.107 In Duncan, the Court held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires states to provide criminal defendants 
a jury only in prosecutions for non-petty offenses.108 The Florida 
Supreme Court concluded that the right to appointed counsel tracked 
 
98. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
99. Id.  
100. Id. at 26. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 26–27. The Florida high court split 4–3 in upholding Argersinger’s 
conviction. Id. 
106. Id.  
107. 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968). 
108. Id. at 154 (“[T]he right to jury trial in serious criminal cases is a fundamental 
right and hence must be recognized by the States as part of their obligation 
to extend due process of law to all persons within their jurisdiction.”). The 
Duncan Court declined to define the line between petty and serious offenses, 
leaving that question for another day because the authorized penalty in the 
case before it clearly qualified the crime involved as a serious offense. Id. at 
161–62 (“We need not . . . settle in this case the exact location of the line 
between petty offenses and serious crimes. It is sufficient for our purposes to 
hold that a crime punishable by two years in prison is, based on past and 
contemporary standards in this country, a serious crime and not a petty 
offense.”) (citations omitted). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 2·2016 
VAWA 2013's Right to Appointed Counsel in Tribal Court Proceedings 
399 
the right to a jury trial—that is, it was only constitutionally required 
in prosecutions for non-petty offenses.109 
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Florida Supreme Court’s 
analogy between the right to a jury trial and the right to appointed 
counsel, holding that the latter is broader than the former.110 The Court 
concluded that the Sixth Amendment was intended to extend the right 
to counsel beyond limitations in the common law, and noted that even 
at common law defendants enjoyed the right to counsel for petty 
offenses.111 The Court further suggested that the right to counsel was 
more fundamental to a fair proceeding than the right to a jury trial.112 
The issues in misdemeanor cases, the Court noted, are no less complex 
than those in a felony trial.113 Focusing on the danger an indigent 
defendant faces of being deprived of liberty without counsel to assist in 
his defense, the Argersinger Court formulated a categorical rule—
imposition of any sentence of incarceration for a misdemeanor offense, 
regardless of its seriousness, on a defendant who has not been repre-
sented by counsel or waived his right to counsel, violates the Sixth 
Amendment, applicable to states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.114 
The next question the Court addressed was whether the right to 
counsel at public expense extended to proceedings other than a criminal 
 
109. State ex rel. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 442, 443 (Fla. 1970). 
110. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 30 (“While there is historical support for limiting the 
‘deep commitment’ to trial by jury to ‘serious criminal cases,’ there is no such 
support for a similar limitation on the right to assistance of counsel[.]”).  
111. Id. at 30–31 (“The Sixth Amendment thus extended the right to counsel 
beyond its common-law dimensions. But there is nothing in the language of 
the Amendment, its history, or in the decisions of this Court, to indicate that 
it was intended to embody a retraction of the right in petty offenses wherein 
the common law previously did require that counsel be provided. We reject, 
therefore, the premise that since prosecutions for crimes punishable by 
imprisonment for less than six months may be tried without a jury, they may 
also be tried without a lawyer.”) (citation omitted). 
112. Id. at 31, 46 (Powell, J., concurring). 
113. Id. at 33 (“The requirement of counsel may well be necessary for a fair trial 
even in a petty-offense prosecution. We are by no means convinced that legal 
and constitutional questions involved in a case that actually leads to 
imprisonment even for a brief period are any less complex than when a 
person can be sent off for six months or more.”). 
114. Id. at 37. Justice Powell concurred. Citing a deep and well-documented 
concern for the burden the Court’s categorical rule would impose on state and 
local government budgets, he advocated for a revitalized Betts-style facts and 
circumstances inquiry. Id. at 63 (Powell, J., concurring) (“I would hold that 
the right to counsel in petty-offense cases is not absolute but is one to be 
determined by the trial courts exercising a judicial discretion on a case-by-
case basis.”) (citation omitted). 
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prosecution in which a person’s liberty was at stake, and, if so, under 
what circumstances. In Gagnon v. Scarpelli,115 decided in 1973, a year 
after Argersinger, the Court addressed whether the Argersinger cate-
gorical right to counsel at public expense extended to probation revo-
cation hearings.116 Gerald Scarpelli pleaded guilty to armed robbery in 
Wisconsin in 1965.117 He was sentenced to fifteen years, but the trial 
court suspended his entire sentence and placed him on probation for 
seven years.118 Scarpelli’s supervision was transferred to Illinois, where 
he was later arrested for burglary.119 Wisconsin revoked Scarpelli’s 
probation without a hearing and he was subsequently remanded into 
custody to serve the fifteen-year sentence on the underlying felony.120 
The Court took up two issues. One, was Scarpelli entitled to a 
hearing before having his probation revoked? And, two, if so, would he 
be entitled to appointed counsel at a probation revocation hearing?121 
In answering the first question, the Court held that probation revo-
cation is not a stage of criminal prosecution.122 This matters because 
once the Court designates a proceeding a “stage of criminal pro-
secution,” the subject of the proceeding is entitled to the full comple-
ment of constitutional trial rights and protections available to criminal 
defendants under the Constitution.123 The Court considered the second 
 
115. 411 U.S. 778 (1973). 
116. Id.  
117. Id. at 779. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 779–80. 
120. Id. at 780. 
121. Id. at 779. 
122. Id. at 782. 
123. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 485–88 (1972) (holding that 
revocation of parole is not a part of a criminal prosecution because it involves 
deprivation of conditional liberty, but the parolee is nonetheless entitled to 
minimal due process at a preliminary hearing to determine whether probable 
cause exists and a final hearing to adjudicate alleged violation because loss of 
liberty is a serious deprivation). The process due a parolee at a preliminary 
hearing is notice of the alleged violation; opportunity to appear and present 
evidence; a conditional right to confront adverse witnesses; an independent 
decision-maker; and a written report of the hearing. Id. at 486–87. The 
parolee’s final hearing is less summary and it requires similar elements—
written notice of the alleged violation; disclosure of evidence; “opportunity to 
be heard in person” and present evidence; “right to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses” (unless good cause is found for not allowing 
confrontation); “a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing body;” and a “written 
statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for 
revoking parole.” Id. at 487–89. Morrissey involved a revocation of parole, 
not probation (the proceeding at issue in Gagnon). The Gagnon Court found 
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issue—whether an indigent probationer or parolee has a due process 
right to be represented by appointed counsel at these hearings—to be 
the more difficult question of the two.124 
As noted, the anchor for the Argersinger Court’s categorical rule 
requiring appointment of counsel before a defendant can be incarcerated 
was the threat of an unjust loss of liberty faced by indigent defendants 
forced to defend criminal charges without the assistance of counsel.125 
The Gagnon Court, in contrast, focused on the nature of a probation 
revocation to determine whether it was similar enough to an adversarial 
criminal proceeding in all instances to require appointment of counsel.126 
Engaging in somewhat circular reasoning, the Gagnon Court concluded 
that it wasn’t. Justice Powell, who concurred in Argersinger and who 
would have adopted a Betts-style facts and circumstances test in 
Argersinger,127 authored the Court’s unanimous opinion in Gagnon.128 
Reasoning that the primary state actor in a revocation proceeding (the 
probation or parole officer) is a non-lawyer whose mission usually is to 
rehabilitate the offender, not a law-trained prosecutor who is seeking to 
punish the offender, the Gagnon Court held that not every subject of a 
revocation will require assistance of counsel to protect his due process 
rights.129 In other words—the process doesn’t necessarily need attorneys 
unless attorneys are inserted into the process, even if the end result is 
 
no meaningful distinction between parole and probation for due process 
purposes. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782. 
124. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 783. 
125. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). 
126. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 787–89. 
127. See supra note 114 (noting Justice Powell’s preference for use of case-by-
case discretion). 
128. Justice Douglas dissented on the application of the case-by-case analysis to 
Scarpelli’s hearing because of his claim that his confession was made under 
duress. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 791 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). The Court, 
however, unanimously adopted a case-by-case test over a categorical 
approach in the parole/probation revocation context. Id. at 790. 
129. Id. at 783–85. (“Our first point of reference is the character of probation or 
parole. . . . [T]he ‘purpose [of parole] is to help individuals reintegrate into 
society as constructive individuals as soon as they are able’ [and t]he duty and 
attitude of the probation or parole officer reflect this purpose: ‘While the parole 
or probation officer recognizes his double duty to the welfare of his clients and 
to the safety of the general community, by and large concern for the client 
dominates his professional attitude. . . .’ The parole officer’s attitude toward 
these decisions reflects the rehabilitative rather than punitive focus of the 
probation/parole system[.]” (first quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 
477 (1972); then quoting F. Remington et al., Criminal Justice 
Administration: Materials and Cases 910–11 (1969))). 
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a deprivation of the revokee’s130 liberty.131 The Court allowed that 
sometimes this relationship between probation/parole officers and a 
potential revokee isn’t always harmonious132—for example, where a 
probation/parole officer and the person subject to revocation don’t see 
eye-to-eye on the factual basis or circumstances surrounding an alleged 
violation.133 In those instances, the Court noted that due process may 
require appointment of counsel for the revokee. 
Explicitly acknowledging that it was departing from the Gideon 
and Argersinger categorical approach, the Gagnon Court held that in 
the parole/probation revocation context, the right to appointed counsel 
 
130. I was unable to find the word “revokee” in any standard English dictionary. 
At least one federal court and the Harvard Law Review, however, have used 
the term. See Young v. McKune, 280 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (D. Kan. 2003) 
(referring to Plaintiff in a section 1983 case as the “former parole revokee”); 
see also Right to Hearing at Parole Revocation, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 95, 101 
(1972) (“Perhaps this language foreshadows a willingness to exclude those 
already incarcerated from the reach of due process. However, some courts 
have found the loss of liberty of a prisoner who is placed in solitary 
confinement or whose sentence is effectively increased through loss of ‘good 
time’ to be as ‘grievous’ as that of a parole revokee.”) (citations omitted). 
Thus, at least two reputable sources agree that even if “revokee” is not a 
word, it ought to be. 
131. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 787–88 (“The introduction of counsel into a revocation 
proceeding will alter significantly the nature of the proceeding. If counsel is 
provided for the probationer or parolee, the State in turn will normally 
provide its own counsel; lawyers, by training and disposition, are advocates 
and bound by professional duty to present all available evidence and 
arguments in support of their clients’ positions and to contest with vigor all 
adverse evidence and views. The role of the hearing body itself . . . may 
become more akin to that of a judge at a trial, and less attuned to the 
rehabilitative needs of the individual probationer or parolee. . . . Certainly, 
the decisionmaking process will be prolonged, and the financial cost to the 
State—for appointed counsel, counsel for the State, a longer record, and the 
possibility of judicial review—will not be insubstantial.”) (citations omitted). 
132. Id. at 785 (“But an exclusive focus on the benevolent attitudes of those who 
administer the probation/parole system when it is working successfully 
obscures the modification in attitude which is likely to take place once the 
officer has decided to recommend revocation. Even though the officer is not 
by this recommendation converted into a prosecutor committed to convict, 
his role as counsellor to the probationer or parolee is then surely 
compromised.”). 
133. Id. (“When the officer’s view of the probationer’s or parolee’s conduct differs 
in this fundamental way from the latter’s own view, due process requires that 
the difference be resolved before revocation becomes final. Both the 
probationer or parolee and the State have interests in the accurate finding of 
fact and the informed use of discretion—the probationer or parolee to insure 
that his liberty is not unjustifiably taken away and the State to make certain 
that it is neither unnecessarily interrupting a successful effort at rehabilitation 
nor imprudently prejudicing the safety of the community.”). 
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would be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.134 In so doing, the Gagnon 
Court weighed the costs to the states and the benefits to the potential 
revokee of inserting counsel into the process.135 There can be little doubt 
that the financial and administrative burden of imposing a categorical 
right to appointed counsel in revocation hearings would have been 
considerable, and that this cost would be absorbed on the state level, 
where most criminal proceedings in the U.S. occur. This resource 
consideration did not sway the majorities in Gideon or Argersinger.136 
But it mattered in Gagnon.137 Thus, in this round of federalism chicken, 
pragmatism and concerns about upsetting state budgets and autonomy 
with categorical federal constitutional mandates won out over 
consistency and the interests promoted by blanket rules of federal 
constitutional criminal procedure.138 
 
134. Id. at 788–89 (“In so concluding, we are of course aware that the case-by-
case approach to the right to counsel in felony prosecutions adopted in Betts 
v. Brady, was later rejected in favor of a per se rule in Gideon v. Wainwright. 
We do not, however, draw from Gideon and Argersinger the conclusion that 
a case-by-case approach to furnishing counsel is necessarily inadequate to 
protect constitutional rights asserted in varying types of proceedings: there 
are critical differences between criminal trials and probation or parole 
revocation hearings, and both society and the probationer or parolee have 
stakes in preserving these differences.”) (citations omitted). 
135. Id. at 790 (“We thus find no justification for a new inflexible constitutional 
rule with respect to the requirement of counsel. We think, rather, that the 
decision as to the need for counsel must be made on a case-by-case basis in 
the exercise of a sound discretion by the state authority charged with 
responsibility for administering the probation and parole system. Although 
the presence and participation of counsel will probably be both undesirable 
and constitutionally unnecessary in most revocation hearings, there will 
remain certain cases in which fundamental fairness—the touchstone of due 
process—will require that the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent 
probationers or parolees.”). 
136. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–44 (1963) (deciding the issue 
without any reference to resource considerations); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 
407 U.S. 25, 37 n.7 (1972) (finding the country has sufficient legal resources 
to represent the offenders affected by the case). 
137. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 788 n.11 (“The scope of the practical 
problem which would be occasioned by a requirement of counsel in all 
revocation cases is suggested by the fact that in the mid-1960’s there was an 
estimated average of 20,000 adult felony parole revocations and 108,000 adult 
probation revocations each year.”) (citing President’s Comm’n on Law 
Enf’t and Admin. of Justice, Task Force Report: The Courts 56 
n.28 (1967)). 
138. The Seventh Circuit had concluded that Scarpelli was entitled to appointed 
counsel at his revocation hearing. Given the Supreme Court’s 1963 holding 
in Gideon, the Seventh Circuit could perhaps be forgiven for concluding in 
1971 that there was a categorical right to counsel in probation revocation 
proceedings. According to the Gagnon Court, a categorical approach in this 
context fails to account for the costs to the states of this added requirement 
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The next issue the Court tackled in its ongoing effort to flesh out 
Argersinger was whether the right to appointed counsel in misdemeanor 
cases is triggered only when a trial court actually imposes a sentence of 
incarceration on an indigent defendant, or whether the mere possibility 
of receiving a sentence of incarceration for a misdemeanor conviction 
gives rise to the right to appointed counsel. The Court addressed this 
issue in 1979 in Scott v. Illinois.139 Scott was convicted of shoplifting 
under a theft statute authorizing a jail sentence of up to one year and 
up to a $500 fine.140 Following a bench trial in which he was not 
represented by counsel, Scott was fined $50, but did not receive any jail 
time.141 Scott sought review of his uncounseled conviction, arguing that 
he should have been provided counsel at public expense because the 
statute of conviction authorized a potential penalty of incarceration, 
even if he was not actually sentenced to a term of incarceration—that 
is, the right to appointed counsel under Argersinger attaches when an 
indigent is charged with a crime that authorizes incarceration as a 
punishment, not only when the trial court imposes a term of incar-
ceration.142 
A divided Court rejected Scott’s argument and declined to extend 
Argersinger to cases in which incarceration was merely authorized, ra-
ther than actually imposed.143 The Scott majority confirmed 
Argersinger’s holding that actual incarceration, not just the threat of 
incarceration, triggers the right to appointed counsel.144 Five justices 
 
without a (according to the Court) discernable benefit to the potential 
revokee. Id. at 787 (“By the same token, we think that the Court of Appeals 
erred in accepting respondent’s contention that the State is under a 
constitutional duty to provide counsel for indigents in all probation or 
parole revocation cases. While such a rule has the appeal of simplicity, it 
would impose direct costs and serious collateral disadvantages without regard 
to the need or the likelihood in a particular case for a constructive 
contribution by counsel.”). 
139. 440 U.S. 367 (1979). 
140. Id. at 368. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 369. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, which was joined 
by four Justices. Id. at 367. Justice Powell concurred in the result, noting for 
the record his continued objection to the Argersinger categorical holding. Id. 
at 374 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Brennan filed a dissent, joined by 
Justices Marshall and Stevens. Id. at 375 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice 
Blackmun filed a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 389 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
144. I say “confirmed” because there was considerable bickering between the Scott 
majority and dissenters about whether Argersinger left the actual versus 
authorized incarceration question open (the dissenters’ view) or whether 
Argersinger conclusively decided the issue (the majority’s view). Id. at 373, 
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joined the Scott majority. Justice Powell, who dissented in Argersinger 
and who authored the majority opinion in Gagnon (which, the reader 
will recall, rejected a categorical approach in the probation/parole 
context), concurred in Scott to point out that he still objected to 
Argersinger’s categorical approach and was only grudgingly joining in 
the Scott opinion because the doctrine of stare decisis left him no 
choice.145 Justice Brennan, who concurred in Argersinger, wrote a 
dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Marshall (who was in the 
Argersinger majority) and Stevens (who was not on the Court when 
Argersinger was decided). Justice Blackmun (also in the Argersinger 
majority) dissented separately.146 
Justice Rehnquist—who had joined Powell’s concurrence in 
Argersinger—wrote the Scott majority opinion affirming Argersinger, 
but not before coming out swinging at the notion that a right to 
appointed counsel even exists under the Sixth Amendment. Justice 
Rehnquist opened his review of the case law by commenting “[t]here is 
considerable doubt that the Sixth Amendment itself, as originally 
drafted by the Framers of the Bill of Rights, contemplated any guar-
antee other than the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution in a 
federal court to employ a lawyer to assist in his defense.”147 And, for 
good measure, he described the right to appointed counsel jurisprudence 
as confused and a departure from the literal meaning of the Sixth 
Amendment. In other words, regardless of what the Constitution re-
quired, it was time to slam on the federalism brakes in the Court’s right 
to appointed counsel joyride: 
The number of separate opinions in Gideon, Duncan, Baldwin,148 
and Argersinger, suggests that constitutional line drawing 
becomes more difficult as the reach of the Constitution is 
extended further, and as efforts are made to transpose lines from 
one area of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence to another. The 
process of incorporation creates special difficulties, for the state 
 
379. In defense of the dissenters, the issue did confound the lower courts, so 
perhaps Argersinger was not quite as clear as the Scott majority supposed. 
Id. at 368 (noting that the Court granted certiorari in Scott “to resolve a 
conflict among state and lower federal courts regarding the proper 
application of our decision in Argersinger v. Hamlin”). 
145. Id. at 374–75 (Powell, J., concurring). 
146. See supra note 143 (outlining the disposition of each Justice in Scott). 
147. Scott, 440 U.S. at 370. Justice Rehnquist cited a lone authority written 
over twenty years before the Scott opinion—William M. Beaney, The 
Right to Counsel in American Courts 27–30 (1955)—in support of 
this assertion. Id. 
148. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (“[N]o offense can be deemed 
‘petty’ for purposes of the right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more 
than six months is authorized.”). 
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and federal contexts are often different and application of the 
same principle may have ramifications distinct in degree and kind. 
. . . As a matter of constitutional adjudication, we are, therefore, 
less willing to extrapolate an already extended line when, 
although the general nature of the principle sought to be applied 
is clear, its precise limits and their ramifications become less so. 
We have now in our decided cases departed from the literal 
meaning of the Sixth Amendment. And we cannot fall back on 
the common law as it existed prior to the enactment of that 
Amendment, since it perversely gave less in the way of right to 
counsel to accused felons than to those accused of misde-
meanors.149 
The Scott majority felt that Argersinger was clear, although allowing 
that it was perhaps not “unmistakably” so.150 Further, the majority 
concluded, even if the issue were one of first impression, actual im-
prisonment is different enough from other types of punishments to make 
it the constitutionally defensible line for the right to appointed counsel 
in misdemeanor cases.151 Finally, the majority added, although the 
Argersinger rule was working well enough, any extension of the 
constitutional right to appointed counsel would impose additional 
indefensible burdens on the states.152 
As noted, three Justices who signed off in Argersinger (Brennan, 
Marshall, and Blackmun) dissented in Scott, joined by one Justice who 
was not on the Court when Argersinger was decided (Stevens).153 
Brennan’s dissent, joined by Marshall and Stevens, advocated for an 
authorized imprisonment, instead of an actual imprisonment, standard 
on three grounds. One, the authorized imprisonment standard is more 
 
149. Scott, 440 U.S. at 372. 
150. Id. at 373 (“Although the intentions of the Argersinger Court are not 
unmistakably clear from its opinion, we conclude today that Argersinger 
did indeed delimit the constitutional right to appointed counsel in state 
criminal proceedings.”) (citation omitted). 
151. Id. (“Even were the matter res nova, we believe that the central premise 
of Argersinger—that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind 
from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment—is eminently sound and 
warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the 
constitutional right to appointment of counsel.”). 
152. Id. at 373–74 (“Argersinger has proved reasonably workable, whereas any 
extension would create confusion and impose unpredictable, but 
necessarily substantial, costs on 50 quite diverse States. We therefore hold 
that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution require only that no indigent criminal defendant be 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him 
the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense.”) (citation 
omitted). 
153. See supra note 143 (outlining the disposition of each Justice in Scott).  
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faithful to the Sixth Amendment as interpreted in Gideon (in which 
Brennan had participated and joined the majority)—the penalty 
attached to a crime by a state accurately reflects its seriousness and it 
drives the procedure associated with its prosecution. And it was those 
serious, complex proceedings, the Brennan dissent argued, that Gideon 
found required assistance of counsel to ensure due process.154 Second, as 
a practical matter, the Brennan dissent argued that the “authorized 
imprisonment” test does not present the administrative and fairness 
concerns that the “actual imprisonment” standard presents—looking to 
the authorized imprisonment eliminates the need to predict before trial 
whether a particular defendant should be incarcerated, and it addresses 
the potential for unequal treatment and biased decision-making inher-
ent in that process.155 Third, the Brennan dissent argued that the 
“authorized imprisonment” test avoids the separation of powers prob-
lem created by the actual imprisonment test because it doesn’t arti-
ficially constrain trial courts’ authority to impose a term of imprison-
ment deemed appropriate by the legislature.156 
Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Scott propounded a hybrid 
categorical rule—the Argersinger right (the right to appointed counsel 
 
154. Scott, 440 U.S. at 382–83 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ‘authorized 
imprisonment’ standard more faithfully implements the principles of the Sixth 
Amendment identified in Gideon. The procedural rules established by state 
statutes are geared to the nature of the potential penalty for an offense, not to 
the actual penalty imposed in particular cases. The authorized penalty is also 
a better predictor of the stigma and other collateral consequences that attach 
to conviction of an offense. . . . Imprisonment is a sanction particularly 
associated with criminal offenses; trials of offenses punishable by 
imprisonment accordingly possess the characteristics found by Gideon to 
require the appointment of counsel. By contrast, the ‘actual imprisonment’ 
standard . . . denies the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions to accuseds 
who suffer the severe consequences of prosecution other than 
imprisonment.”). 
155. Id. at 383 (“[T]he ‘authorized imprisonment’ test presents no problems of 
administration. It avoids the necessity for time-consuming consideration of 
the likely sentence in each individual case before trial and the attendant 
problems of inaccurate predictions, unequal treatment, and apparent and 
actual bias.”). 
156. Id. at 383–84 (“Finally, the ‘authorized imprisonment’ test ensures that courts 
will not abrogate legislative judgments concerning the appropriate range of 
penalties to be considered for each offense. Under the ‘actual imprisonment’ 
standard, ‘[t]he judge will . . . be forced to decide in advance of trial—and 
without hearing the evidence—whether he will forgo entirely his judicial 
discretion to impose some sentence of imprisonment and abandon his 
responsibility to consider the full range of punishments established by the 
legislature. His alternatives, assuming the availability of counsel, will be to 
appoint counsel and retain the discretion vested in him by law, or to abandon 
this discretion in advance and proceed without counsel.’” (quoting 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 53 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring))). 
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before any term of imprisonment for any offense can be imposed by a 
trial court), plus a right to appointed counsel in all other prosecutions 
extending as far as the jury right. Stated another way, Justice Black-
mun’s right to counsel, in addition to including cases falling under 
Argersinger, would require appointed counsel in all misdemeanor prose-
cutions for offenses whose authorized penalty exceeds six months (i.e. 
serious misdemeanors), but exclude prosecutions for misdemeanor 
offenses whose authorized penalty includes a term of incarceration of 
less than six months (i.e. petty offenses), even if no actual incarceration 
results. 
The Court’s next installment in its right to appointed counsel case 
law was Alabama v. Shelton,157 decided in 2002. There the Court 
considered whether a state trial court can impose a suspended sentence 
of incarceration (i.e. a term of imprisonment that will only be activated 
if a defendant fails to comply with the terms of his conditional release) 
without first appointing counsel.158 Or, as the Court framed the issue, 
whether a suspended sentence, which does not expose a defendant to 
either immediate or inevitable incarceration, is a “term of imprison-
ment” within the meaning of Argersinger and Scott. A divided Court 
in Shelton said “yes,” categorically—a suspended or conditional 
sentence that may result in a term of incarceration of any length is a 
“term of imprisonment” that triggers the right to appointed counsel 
even if no actual imprisonment ever results.159 The upshot of Shelton is 
that a trial court may never impose a conditional or suspended sentence 
of incarceration on an indigent without first appointing counsel, a rule 
that effectively sweeps away not only the trial court’s ability to 
incarcerate the defendant at some later date, but its ability to put a 
defendant on post-conviction probation to the extent probation is 
linked to a term of potential incarceration.160 
Everyone in Shelton, including the State of Alabama, agreed that 
the Sixth Amendment bars activation of a suspended sentence of in-
carceration for an uncounseled conviction without more.161 The issue 
 
157. 535 U.S. 654 (2002). 
158. LeReed Shelton was convicted of third-degree assault, a misdemeanor 
punishable by up to one year incarceration, following a jury trial. Id. at 658. 
The trial court sentenced Shelton to a jail term of thirty days, but suspended 
the sentence and placed him on two years of unsupervised probation, 
conditioned on his payment of court costs, a $500 fine, reparations of $25, and 
restitution in the amount of $516.69. Id. 
159. Id. at 656–58. 
160. As a practical matter, Shelton forecloses the trial court’s option of attaching 
probation to an imposed and suspended sentence for an indigent unless it 
provides appointed counsel. Id. at 662. 
161. Id. at 660–61 (“Alabama now concedes that the Sixth Amendment bars 
activation of a suspended sentence for an uncounseled conviction, but 
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was whether it also bars a trial court from imposing a suspended or 
conditional sentence of incarceration without appointing counsel at the 
outset. The Shelton majority, focusing on the reliability of the convic-
tion corresponding to the prison sentence, held that under Argersinger 
and Scott it does.162 In doing so, Shelton confirmed that the primary 
concern of right to appointed counsel analysis remains the threat of an 
unjust deprivation of liberty, so it takes more than just a statute 
authorizing incarceration to trigger an indigent’s right to appointed 
counsel in misdemeanor prosecutions. But it moved the line at which 
that threat of an unjust deprivation of liberty will be said to have 
materialized for constitutional purposes by holding that something 
short of actual incarceration will be considered actual incarceration for 
the Argersinger inquiry. The court placed the line at a specific term of 
imprisonment that is identified, but that will only potentially be im-
posed on the defendant if he doesn’t fly right on conditional post-
conviction release163 (a potential actual incarceration test?). 
Shelton produced a 5–4 split, with the dissenters disagreeing en-
tirely, and vehemently, with the majority’s application of the 
Argersinger line of cases.164 According to the dissent, the trigger for the 
right to counsel at public expense is an actual deprivation of liberty; 
imposition of a sentence that does not actually deprive a defendant of 
liberty, the dissent reasoned, does not implicate the constitutional right 
 
maintains that the Constitution does not prohibit imposition of such a 
sentence as a method of effectuating probationary punishment.”) (emphasis 
omitted). 
162. Id. at 667 (“We think it plain that a hearing [to impose a conditional or 
suspended sentence after violation of the terms or conditions of suspension] 
so timed and structured cannot compensate for the absence of trial counsel, 
for it does not even address the key Sixth Amendment inquiry: whether the 
adjudication of guilt corresponding to the prison sentence is sufficiently 
reliable to permit incarceration. Deprived of counsel when tried, convicted, 
and sentenced, and unable to challenge the original judgment at a 
subsequent probation revocation hearing, a defendant in Shelton’s 
circumstances faces incarceration on a conviction that has never been 
subjected to ‘the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.’ The Sixth 
Amendment does not countenance this result.” (quoting United States v. 
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984))). 
163. Id. at 674 (“Satisfied that Shelton is entitled to appointed counsel at the 
critical stage when his guilt or innocence of the charged crime is decided and 
his vulnerability to imprisonment is determined, we affirm the judgment of 
the Supreme Court of Alabama.”). 
164. Justice Scalia wrote the dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist (the 
only Argersinger holdover still on the Court), and Justices Kennedy and 
Thomas. Id.  
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to counsel.165 That right is only implicated, according to the dissent, at 
the time a sentence of incarceration is imposed, and no sooner.166 
To recap167—Gideon requires state trial courts to appoint counsel 
to indigents in all prosecutions for serious offenses (i.e. felony offenses, 
 
165. Id. at 675 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he central premise of Argersinger—
that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere 
threat of imprisonment—is eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual 
imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of 
counsel. We have repeatedly emphasized actual imprisonment as the 
touchstone of entitlement to appointed counsel. . . . Today’s decision ignores 
this long and consistent jurisprudence, extending the misdemeanor right to 
counsel to cases bearing the mere threat of imprisonment. Respondent’s 
30-day suspended sentence, and the accompanying 2-year term of 
probation, are invalidated for lack of appointed counsel even though 
respondent has not suffered, and may never suffer, a deprivation of liberty.”) 
(emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). 
166. Id. at 676 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In the future, if and when the State of 
Alabama seeks to imprison respondent on the previously suspended sentence, 
we can ask whether the procedural safeguards attending the imposition of 
that sentence comply with the Constitution. But that question is not before 
us now.”) (emphasis omitted). 
167. Included at the end of this Article for the reader’s reference is a chart 
tracking the various holdings and opinions in the Court’s primary right to 
appointed counsel cases. Outside of adult criminal trial proceedings, the 
Court has extended the Gideon right to a defendant’s first appeal of right 
in criminal cases, and to some juvenile delinquency proceedings. See Halbert 
v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 606 (2005) (holding that the due process and 
equal protection clauses require appointment of counsel for indigent 
defendants in first-tier review); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) 
(finding that the Fourteenth Amendment “requires that in respect of 
proceedings to determine delinquency which may result in commitment to 
an institution in which the juvenile’s freedom is curtailed, the child and his 
parents must be notified of the child’s right to be represented by counsel 
retained by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will 
be appointed to represent the child”). A companion issue to the question of 
whether and when a trial court must provide indigents appointed counsel 
is whether and how uncounseled prior misdemeanor convictions (i.e. prior 
prosecutions in which the trial court was not constitutionally required to 
appoint counsel) can be used in subsequent proceedings either as a sentencing 
factor or as a predicate offense element for a subsequent offense (such as a 
repeat offender charge). See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994) 
(holding that an uncounseled prior misdemeanor conviction, valid due to 
absence of imposition of prison term, is also valid when used to enhance 
punishment for subsequent conviction); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 
(1967) (holding that a state or federal conviction obtained in violation of 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel cannot be used in subsequent 
proceeding “to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense”). 
These issues are of tremendous importance in Indian country criminal 
prosecutions. See United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016) (using 
uncounseled prior tribal court domestic abuse convictions as predicate 
offenses in subsequent federal prosecution does not offend Constitution). 
But they are beyond the scope of this Article. 
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traditionally defined as offenses whose penalty includes a term of in-
carceration of over a year). In addition, Argersinger entitles all indigent 
defendants to appointed counsel in misdemeanor prosecutions before 
they can be imprisoned for any length of time, making no distinction 
between petty misdemeanors (i.e. offenses punishable by no more than 
six months imprisonment) and serious misdemeanors (i.e. offenses pun-
ishable by over six months, but less than one year, imprisonment). The 
Brennan dissenters in Scott read Argersinger to extend to all misde-
meanor offenses—petty or serious—whose statutes authorize any term 
of imprisonment as a penalty, regardless of length, even if no actual 
term of imprisonment results. Justice Blackmun would have had the 
right to appointed counsel include all prosecutions for offenses with an 
authorized punishment over six months incarceration, whether impris-
onment results or not, but exclude prosecutions for petty misdemeanors 
even if they are jailable offenses (unless, of course, they result in actual 
incarceration, which is covered by Argersinger). Shelton is the Court’s 
last word on this subject. In Shelton, a sharply divided Court held that, 
in addition to misdemeanor cases covered by the Argersinger actual 
imprisonment trigger, the Sixth Amendment requires state trial courts 
to appoint counsel in misdemeanor prosecutions of indigents before they 
can impose a conditional or suspended sentence that includes any term 
of imprisonment.168 
II. Making Sense of the Right— 
Why Does the Constitution Require Appointed 
Counsel for Poor People Charged with Misdemeanors 
Only When They are Actually Incarcerated? 
Regardless of whether one agrees that the Sixth Amendment’s 
guarantee of the right to assistance of counsel in criminal cases includes 
the right to counsel at public expense for indigents, rather than just the 
right to retain counsel for those who can afford it,169 a more convoluted 
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel 
than the Court’s current one would be hard to concoct. If one allows 
(even if just for the sake of argument) that the Sixth Amendment 
requires appointment of counsel to indigent defendants, and that this 
requirement applies with full force to the states via the Fourteenth 
 
168. Given the fractured jurisprudence in this area, the sharp divide in Shelton, 
the Court’s most recent major right to appointed counsel holding, and the 
significant turnover in personnel on the Court since it decided Shelton in 
2002 (only four of the Shelton justices, two from the majority—Ginsburg and 
Breyer, and two from the dissent—Kennedy and Thomas—remain on the 
Court), some of these issues may be up for reexamination if and when they 
reach the Court again. 
169. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.  
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Amendment, it would not be unreasonable to insist that “in all criminal 
prosecutions” means, well, in all criminal prosecutions.170 If an in-
digent’s right to counsel at public expense attached to “all criminal 
prosecutions,” the natural trigger for appointment of counsel would be 
the beginning of adversarial criminal proceedings, a constitutionally de-
fensible line (and, incidentally, when the right to assistance of retained 
counsel attaches).171 But the Court has never even suggested going this 
far. Alternatively, the Court could have linked the right to appointed 
counsel to the seriousness of the offense, as reflected in the penalty the 
legislature has assigned to it, as it has done with the federal consti-
tutional right to a jury trial. But, as noted, the Court explicitly rejected 
this approach in Argersinger. 
Instead, the Court has used different approaches to slicing and 
dicing the state court indigent’s right to appointed counsel. In Gideon 
it looked to the nature and seriousness of the charged offense, and 
adopted seriousness as a proxy for complexity, and complexity (and the 
lay defendant’s concomitant inability to protect his interests) as the 
reason counsel is constitutionally required in felony cases. But under 
the Argersinger line of cases, the Court looked to the actual versus 
authorized incarceration faced by the indigent defendant and settled on 
preventing an unjust loss of liberty as the reason a trial court cannot 
incarcerate an indigent defendant for a misdemeanor offense unless she 
has been provided appointed counsel, regardless of the seriousness of 
the offense or complexity of the case—although Shelton might be 
viewed as a bit of a fudge on this point. 
If the Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused the right to assis-
tance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions, and if Gideon is correct 
that the Sixth Amendment assistance of counsel guarantee is mean-
ingless unless it includes the right to appointed counsel if you are poor, 
why has the question of when and whether state trial courts must 
appoint counsel to represent poor people charged with crimes so 
bedeviled the Court? And why has it provided such an awkward re-
sponse to that question—that poor people charged with felonies are 
always entitled to appointed counsel, but poor people charged with 
 
170. Of course, what is included in a “criminal prosecution” can be an issue. Cf. 
Betterman v. Montana, No. 14-1457, slip op. at 1 (S. Ct. May 19, 2016) 
(sentencing is not part of criminal trial for Sixth Amendment speedy trial 
purposes). But once that is determined, arguing that “all” means something 
less than “all” might be a harder case to make. 
171. Right to Counsel, 32 Geo. L. J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. (Special Issue) 
455, 455–56 (2003) (“The right to counsel attaches at or after the initiation 
of adversarial judicial proceedings whether by way of formal charge, 
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment, and no request 
for counsel need be made by the accused.”) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotations removed). 
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misdemeanors are only entitled to appointed counsel if they go to jail,172 
even though penalties short of incarceration can have equally disastrous 
results for a defendant, results that could be avoided or ameliorated 
with the assistance of counsel?173 
The answer, I submit, can be found in the interrelated concerns of 
federalism and funding, the level of angst those topics inspire in federal 
Justices, and the Court’s efforts to strike a practical balance in the 
economics of justice. Every new rule of federal constitutional criminal 
procedure infringes on states’ autonomy to prosecute and punish 
conduct they deem criminal. It also potentially stifles innovation and 
flexibility at the local level, where the overwhelming number of criminal 
cases in the United States are prosecuted. And every new rule of federal 
constitutional criminal procedure carries a potential cost that must be 
borne by state and local governments, who must either find new 
resources, or re-allocate existing ones within their individual criminal 
justice systems, to meet federal constitutional mandates.174 This is 
 
172. This, of course, creates a lesser right to assistance of counsel for poor people 
since indigents only have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in some 
criminal prosecutions, whereas a person who can afford retained counsel can 
avail herself of assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions. Id. at 460–62. 
173. Monetary penalties (such as fines and restitution) and collateral consequences 
of conviction (such as loss of eligibility for government benefits or privileges, 
or impairment of employment and educational opportunities) resulting from 
a misdemeanor conviction can have potentially longer-lasting and more severe 
impacts on defendants—especially indigent defendants—than a short jail 
term. 
174. Professor John Pfaff, of Fordham Law School, and author of the forthcoming 
book “Locked In: The True Causes of Mass Incarceration and How to 
Achieve Real Reform,” recently described this dynamic in a New York Times 
op-ed piece. John Pfaff, A Mockery of Justice for the Poor, N.Y. Times 
(Apr. 29, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/30/opinion/a-mockery-of-
justice-for-the-poor.html [https://perma.cc/U87C-J77J]. He calls Gideon 
“no minor decision” in terms of resources, noting that approximately eighty 
percent of all state criminal defendants in the United States qualify for 
appointed counsel. Id. Notwithstanding, “state and county spending on 
lawyers for the poor amounts to only $2.3 billion—barely 1 percent of the 
more than $200 billion governments spend annually on criminal justice.” Id. 
He describes “public defense [as] starved of resources while facing impossible 
caseloads that mock the idea of justice for the poor.” Id. He advocates that 
the federal government start ponying up a little more and provide more federal 
funding for public defense, which he reports is currently just a few million 
dollars a year nationally. Id. As a general proposition, I agree the federal 
government should fund its mandates to state and local governments, whether 
legislative or judicial. In my view, however, salvation lies not in more federal 
funding and more lawyers, but in state criminal justice reform initiatives 
aimed at producing fewer criminals at the front end. The United States 
simply produces more criminals than the criminal justice system it is willing 
to fund can constitutionally prosecute and punish. Decriminalizing conduct 
that can be better managed through civil and regulatory systems, and 
actively diverting individuals whose conduct might be better addressed 
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federalism’s predicament in a resource-hungry system. Most criminal 
cases are prosecuted at the state, not the federal, level. When the Su-
preme Court lays down a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure, 
its implementation can often involve significant costs that will be borne 
most heavily, if not exclusively, at the state and local level. 
Perhaps nowhere are the effects of this type of unfunded federal 
judicial mandate better illustrated, or more acutely felt, than with the 
right to counsel at public expense—a federal constitutional imperative 
with an enormous price tag at the front end (paying for attorneys to 
represent defendants) whose violation is vindicated at the back end (by 
overturning state criminal convictions). In an effort to contain the po-
tentially enormous resource costs of requiring states to provide 
appointed counsel to indigents in misdemeanor cases, the Court linked 
the constitutional right to counsel at public expense to actual 
incarceration—purportedly because a loss of liberty is different in kind 
and effect from any other penalty a state court can mete out for a 
misdemeanor. But in doing so, it has created a post-conviction test 
whose application pretrial is counterintuitive to say the least.175 By 
linking a trial court’s ability to incarcerate a misdemeanant to the pro-
vision of appointed counsel, the Court forces state trial courts to eva-
luate, pretrial, whether that individual’s case will warrant incarceration 
as a penalty before even considering the merits of the case. As a result, 
jurisdictions may end up simply providing appointed counsel to all 
indigents accused of crimes that carry potential jail sentences, or adopt 
a policy of never imposing jail sentences for certain offenses. When a 
trial court doesn’t impose jail time as a matter of court policy for a 
category of offenses, regardless of an individual defendant’s conduct, 
this undercuts legislative mandate and raises significant separation of 
powers issues176 because it encourages or requires state trial courts to 
 
through the mental health system than the criminal justice system are just 
two starting points.  
175. Justice Brennan thoroughly explored some of the dynamics described in 
this paragraph in his Scott dissent. See supra notes 154–156 and 
accompanying text. 
176. Of course, a cynic could argue that this allows a tough on crime legislature to 
have its cake and eat it too—it can pass criminal misdemeanor laws with high 
potential jail terms penalties, but decline to adequately fund indigent defense 
knowing that courts will likely forgo incarceration in most cases to avoid the 
expense of providing counsel. Cf. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship 
Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L.J. 1, 54 
(1997) (“Countermajoritarian criminal procedure tends to encourage 
legislatures to pass overbroad criminal statutes and to underfund defense 
counsel. These actions in turn tend to mask the costs of procedural rules, 
thereby encouraging courts to make more such rules. That raises legislatures' 
incentive to overcriminalize and underfund. So the circle goes. This is a 
necessary consequence of a system with extensive, judicially defined regulation 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 2·2016 
VAWA 2013's Right to Appointed Counsel in Tribal Court Proceedings 
415 
forgo a punishment authorized by the legislature to avoid the expense 
associated with providing appointed counsel. So much for striking a 
federalism blow on the states’ behalf by drawing the constitutional line 
at actual incarceration, something the Scott majority hoped it was 
doing. 
The deep problem reflected by the Court’s right to appointed 
counsel jurisprudence is that the Court has never reached consensus on 
whether states’ ability or willingness to expend resources is an 
appropriate consideration in delineating the individual federal rights of 
defendants. Whether constitutional analysis is properly driven by prag-
matic considerations like this, or whether it should be followed wherever 
it might lead, is a fundamental question that permeates constitutional 
criminal procedure jurisprudence, and it has indelibly shaped the federal 
right to appointed counsel.177 The extent to which this should be 
considered may be fairly debated. But it is part of the equation and 
this background is critical to understanding and interpreting the sta-
tutory right to appointed counsel in tribal court, discussed below. 
III.  Statutory Right to Counsel in  
Tribal Court Proceedings 
A. Selective Codification— 
Imposition of Federal Constitutional Rights to Tribal Court Proceedings 
As noted in the Introduction, the right to appointed counsel in 
tribal court is governed by the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA),178 as 
amended by the Tribal Law and Order Act (TLOA)179 and the Violence 
Against Women Act Reauthorization of 2013 (VAWA 2013).180 
 
of the criminal process, coupled with extensive legislative authority over 
everything else.”). 
177. Andrew Cohen, How Americans Lost the Right to Counsel, 50 Years After 
‘Gideon,’ The Atlantic (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
national/archive/2013/03/how-americans-lost-the-right-to-counsel-50-years-
after-gideon/273433/ [https://perma.cc/5GG6-ZGRV] (“Today, sadly, the 
Gideon ruling amounts to another unfunded mandate—the right to a lawyer 
for those who need one most is a constitutional aspiration as much as 
anything else. And the reasons are no mystery. Over the intervening half-
century, Congress and state lawmakers consistently have refused to fund 
public defenders’ offices adequately. And, as it has become more conservative 
since 1963, the United States Supreme Court has refused to force legislators to 
do so.”). 
178. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012)). 
179. Pub. L. No. 11-211, § 234(c)(1), 124 Stat. 2258, 2261 (2010) (codified at 25 
U.S.C. §§ 2801–2815 (2012)). 
180. Pub. L. No. 113–4, § 904, 127 Stat. 120 (2013) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304 
(2012)). 
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Understanding the TLOA and VAWA 2013 amendments to the ICRA 
requires a short primer on the nature and extent of tribal court 
jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian country. At the founding, 
tribes were understood to be separate sovereigns, like the states, with 
criminal jurisdiction over anyone, Indian or non-Indian, who violated 
tribal law within their jurisdictions. Early in United States’ history, the 
federal government asserted jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit 
crimes in Indian country.181 Tribes, however, were understood to still 
possess inherent authority over Indians who committed crimes on tribal 
land. This understanding was confirmed by the Supreme Court in 1883 
in Ex parte Crow Dog,182 where the Supreme Court held that under 
federal treaty and statutory law, tribes had inherent authority over 
violations of tribal law committed by Indians on tribal land.183 
 
181. See United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1218 (2005) (stating that tribal 
authority over crime in Indian Country “continued until shortly after the 
ratification of the Constitution, when Congress extended federal jurisdiction 
to non-Indians committing crimes against Indians in Indian territory”); see 
also Carrie E. Garrow & Sarah Deer, Tribal Criminal Law and 
Procedure 42 (Jerry Gardner et al., eds., 2d ed. 2015) (discussing the gap 
in prosecution of non-Indians who commit crimes on tribal nation 
reservations). Congress began legislating tribes’ post-treaty criminal 
jurisdiction with the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-33, 1 
Stat. 137. The 1790 Act and amendments to it formed the foundation for the 
current version of the Indian Country Crimes Act (ICCA), 18 U.S.C. § 1153 
(Supp. I 2013–2014). The 1790 Act placed all interactions with Indians under 
federal law and provided for federal jurisdiction over crimes committed by 
non-Indians against Indians in Indian country. § 5, 1 Stat. at 138. The Indian 
Country Crimes Act of 1817 subsequently reaffirmed federal jurisdiction over 
all crimes committed by non-Indians in Indian country and explicitly 
acknowledged that tribes retained jurisdiction over crimes committed in 
Indian country by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian. 
Pub. L. No., § 2, 3 Stat. 383 (repealed 1834). The relevant provisions of the 
1817 Act are now codified in the General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012). 
The Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834, Pub. L. No. 23-161, § 25, 
4 Stat. 729, 733, repealed the Indian Country Crimes Act of 1817, but 
incorporated the latter’s criminal jurisdiction provision. § 29, 4 Stat. at 
733. 
182. 109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
183. Id. at 572.  
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In direct response to Crow Dog,184 Congress passed the Indian Major 
Crimes Act in 1885.185 The Major Crimes Act provides that Indians who 
commit an enumerated offense in Indian country “shall be subject to 
the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of the 
above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.”186 
The Major Crimes Act, thus, grants the federal government jurisdiction 
over Indians who commit a listed offense187 in Indian country, regardless 
of whether the victim is an Indian or non-Indian.188 As a result of the 
Major Crimes Act, the federal government assumed primary respons-
ibility for prosecuting serious offenses of personal violence committed 
in Indian country. 
 
184. See Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 209–11 (1973) (“The prompt 
congressional response—conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts to 
punish certain offenses—reflected a view that tribal remedies were either 
non-existent or incompatible with principles that Congress thought should 
be controlling.”); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382–83 (1886) 
(“The passage of the act now under consideration was designed to remove 
that objection, and to go further by including such crimes on reservations 
lying within a State.”). 
185. Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 385 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1153, 3242 (2012 & Supp. I 2013–2014)). 18 U.S.C. § 3242 provides: 
“All Indians committing any offense listed in the first paragraph of and 
punishable under section 1153 (relating to offenses committed within Indian 
country) of this title shall be tried in the same courts and in the same manner 
as are all other persons committing such offense within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the United States.”; Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal 
Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 779, 803–04 (2006) 
(describing the role of the Interior Department, which had been seeking 
federal jurisdiction over crimes in Indian Country, in securing the passage of 
the Major Crimes Act: “Armed with the defeat in the Supreme Court, federal 
Interior Department officials promptly returned to Congress. In seeking a law 
to allow them to punish ‘major crimes,’ federal officials claimed that tribal 
laws were inadequate. In a report to Congress in 1884, the Secretary of the 
Interior cited Crow Dog in portraying Indian country as a lawless place. . . . 
Motivated by the Secretary's entreaties, Congress soon enacted the Major 
Crimes Act.”) (citations omitted). 
186. Id. at § 1153(a). 
187. Major Crimes Act, § 9. The current version of the Major Crimes Act 
enumerates fifteen offenses. See infra note 188 and accompanying text. These 
enumerated offenses are, for the most part, defined by distinct federal 
statutes. Offenses that are not defined by federal law are defined and 
punished in accordance with the law of the state where the crime was 
committed. 18 U.S.C. § 1153(b). 
188. The Major Crimes Act places specific crimes committed by an Indian in 
Indian country within federal jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a). The crimes 
are offenses against the person, such as murder and assault that, if 
committed in a state jurisdiction, have traditionally and historically been 
left to state governments to prosecute and punish. Id. 
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Under contemporary federal law, tribes have inherent authority to 
prosecute and punish both member and non-member Indians for crimes 
committed on tribal land.189 Absent an explicit grant from Congress, 
tribes do not have criminal jurisdiction to prosecute non-Indians who 
commit offenses on tribal land.190 Tribal jurisdiction to prosecute and 
punish criminal conduct on tribal land is governed by tribal consti-
tutions or charters, tribal codes, and federal statutory law. Tribal gov-
ernments, however, are not constrained by the federal Constitution be-
cause the various Indian nations are separate sovereigns who did not 
participate in the ratification of the Constitution. Thus, the Bill of 
Rights does not apply to defendants in tribal court proceedings.191 
Congress passed ICRA in 1968. ICRA governs a wide range of both 
criminal and civil law and procedure, and imposes a number of re-
quirements on tribal courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction. ICRA 
 
189. Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 9 (2012); 42 
C.J.S. Indians § 180 (2016) (“A tribe has the inherent power to punish its 
members, as an aspect of its sovereignty. Further, Congress enacted 
legislation specifically authorizing a tribe to prosecute Indian members of a 
different tribe. Thus, under the statutory definitions regarding constitutional 
rights of Indians, ‘powers of self-government’ means the inherent power of 
Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over all Indians. Accordingly, an Indian tribe may exercise 
inherent sovereign judicial power in criminal cases against nonmember 
Indians for crimes committed on the tribe’s reservation. The source of an 
Indian tribe’s power to prosecute and punish an Indian, who is not a member 
of the tribe is, in view of this federal statute, inherent tribal sovereignty 
rather than delegated federal authority.”) (citations omitted). 
190. Id. (“[T]he inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes does not extend to criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes on a reservation. Tribal 
courts have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians unless specifically 
authorized to assume such jurisdiction by Congress.”) (citations omitted). 
191. Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian 
Tribes, 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 113, 198 (2002) (“ICRA was designed to impose 
by statute on the operation of tribal governments many of the constitutional 
guarantees found in the Bill of Rights, as a well as an equal protection 
clause. This statute, of course, was thought necessary because of the Court's 
decision in Talton, holding that Bill of Rights limitations did not apply to 
tribal government since their sovereignty derived from aboriginal sources 
and did not constitute an exercise of federal power.”) (citing Talton v. 
Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896)); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990); 
Samuel E. Ennis & Caroline P. Mayhew, Federal Indian Law and Tribal 
Criminal Justice in the Self-Determination Era, 38 Am. Indian L. Rev. 
421, 428 (2014) (“Since Indian tribes did not participate in the 
Constitutional Convention and did not ‘sign on’ by joining the federal 
union, they are not bound by the Constitution, absent affirmative 
congressional action to the contrary. Rather, federal and state courts have 
recognized that tribal courts generally retain inherent civil and criminal 
jurisdiction over Indian reservations by virtue of their sovereign status.”) 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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extends some, but not all, of the guarantees in the Bill of Rights to 
tribal court criminal defendants.192 As discussed below, although ICRA 
provides for a right to the assistance counsel in all criminal proceedings, 
it does not require appointment of counsel to indigents at public ex-
pense on the same terms as the Sixth Amendment.193 
ICRA limits the sentencing authority of tribal courts.194 With some 
exceptions, even for serious offenses, ICRA generally limits the penalty 
a tribal court can impose for a single offense to one year incarceration 
 
192. Like the Bill of Rights, ICRA provides for the right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures; requires probable cause and particularity 
for warrants; prohibits double jeopardy and compelled self-incrimination; 
provides rights to a speedy and public trial, notice of charges, confrontation 
of witness, compulsory process, and counsel; prohibits excessive bail, fines, 
and cruel and unusual punishment; requires equal protection and due 
process; prohibits bills of attainder and ex post facto laws; and provides for 
six person juries. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2012). See also Philip P. Frickey, 
(Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 Harv. L. 
Rev. 433, 478 (2005) (identifying “the two primary rights ‘missing’ from 
ICRA [as] free representation for indigent defendants and a jury that includes 
nonmembers . . . .”). Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Courts and Federal 
Sentencing, 36 Ariz. St. L.J. 403, 425–26 (2004) (“[ICRA] was enacted 
toward the end of the period of seemingly interminable litigation spawned by 
the ambiguous language of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Incorporation 
Controversy, as this litigation is collectively known, reached a crescendo 
during the Warren Court era. . . . [I]t was not long after enactment of the 
Indian Civil Rights Act that state courts were held to all of the same high 
standards of due process required of tribal courts. But the timing is 
noteworthy and it bears emphasis: tribal courts were required by Congress to 
provide numerous protections to criminal defendants while state courts were 
still arguing in the Supreme Court that some of these same protections need 
not be provided.”). 
193. Cf. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384–85 (1896) (finding that the Bill of 
Rights does not constrain tribal courts); see also United States v. Doherty, 
126 F.3d 769, 777 (6th Cir. 1997), abrogated by Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 
(2001) (“Of course, Talton was decided decades before most of the protections 
of the Bill of Rights were held to be binding on the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore, the specific provision at issue in 
Talton, the right to indictment by a grand jury, to this day has not been held 
to operate on the states, and the Court relied on its prior decision in Hurtado 
v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), to that effect to buttress its holding. 
Nonetheless, Talton has come to stand for the proposition that neither the 
Bill of Rights nor the Fourteenth Amendment operates to constrain the 
governmental actions of Indian tribes, and the Supreme Court has 
consistently decided cases with that understanding. ‘As separate sovereigns 
pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as 
unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed specifically as 
limitations on federal or state authority. . . . [T]he lower federal courts have 
extended the holding of Talton to other provisions of the Bill of Rights, as 
well as to the Fourteenth Amendment.’” (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (citations omitted))). 
194. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1304 (2012 & Supp. I 2013–2014). 
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and a $5,000 fine.195 In two recent legislative enactments, Congress 
carved out some narrow exceptions to these long-standing federal po-
licies. In 2010, under TLOA, Congress authorized tribal courts to go 
beyond ICRA’s one year/$5,000 punishment cap in some circum-
stances.196 A tribal court may now impose a sentence over one year and 
up to three years if: (1) the defendant has been previously convicted of, 
or is being prosecuted for, the same or a comparable offense or if the 
defendant is convicted of a felony-type offense,197 and (2) the tribal 
court extends specific procedural protections to the defendant.198 For 
multiple offenses, ICRA limits a tribal court sentence to imprisonment 
of no more than nine years.199  
Under VAWA 2013, for the first time since tribes were divested of 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, Congress authorized tribes to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians for enumerated domestic 
violence offenses committed on tribal land, in certain circumstances.200 
The cases are subject to TLOA’s three year/$15,000 sentencing cap for 
 
195. Id. § 1302(a)(7)(B). 
196. Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 234, 124 Stat. 2261, 2279–82 (2010) (codified at 25 
U.S.C § 1302 (2012)). 
197. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b). Prior to enactment of the Tribal Law and Order Act 
of 2010, tribal court sentencing authority was capped at one year for all 
offenses. See infra Part IV. § 1302(b) provides: “A tribal court may subject 
a defendant to a term of imprisonment greater than 1 year but not to exceed 
3 years for any 1 offense, or a fine greater than $5,000 but not to exceed 
$15,000, or both, if the defendant is a person accused of a criminal offense 
who—(1) has been previously convicted of the same or a comparable offense 
by any jurisdiction in the United States; or (2) is being prosecuted for an 
offense comparable to an offense that would be punishable by more than 1 
year of imprisonment if prosecuted by the United States or any of the States.”  
198. Id. § 1302(c) (requiring tribes to provide all defendants who receive a 
sentence of more than one year with the right to effective assistance of 
counsel, at public expense, if the defendant is indigent).  
199. Id. § 1302(a)(7)(D). 
200. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 
204, 127 Stat. 54, 120–21. VAWA 2013 added a section to ICRA titled 
“Tribal Jurisdiction Over Crimes of Domestic Violence,” authorizing 
“participating” tribes “to exercise special domestic violence criminal 
jurisdiction over all persons”—over both Indians and non-Indians—who 
commit specific offenses in Indian country. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(1) (Supp. I 
2013–2014). The driving force behind these VAWA 2013 amendments was 
the federal government’s failure to adequately prosecute domestic violence 
crimes in Indian country. See Cynthia Castillo, Tribal Courts, Non-Indians, 
and the Right to an Impartial Jury After the 2013 Reauthorization of 
VAWA, 39 Am. Indian L. Rev. 311, 315–16 (2015) (citing under-
enforcement of crimes of sexual violence as the impetus for VAWA 2013 
provisions for special domestic violence jurisdiction in tribal courts over some 
non-Indians). 
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single offenses and nine year “stacking” cap for multiple offenses.201 As 
discussed below, if a tribal court is exercising jurisdiction over a 
domestic violence offense under VAWA 2013, it is required to provide 
the procedural protections in the TLOA amendments to ICRA to all 
defendants facing incarceration (not just those sentenced to more than 
one year) and to provide additional procedural protections.202 
Exercising TLOA’s enhanced sentencing and VAWA 2013’s ex-
panded jurisdiction is optional for tribes. But not all tribes can par-
ticipate. As discussed below, tribes seeking to exercise these sentencing 
and jurisdictional powers must first extend specific procedural pro-
tections to criminal defendants like those guaranteed to state and 
federal criminal defendants under the federal Constitution. As noted, 
ICRA affords some, but not all, of the criminal procedural protections 
found in the Bill of Rights. And, as further discussed below, it provides 
for “tiered” protection to defendants that is tied to the extent of the 
authority a tribe seeks to exercise. 
B. ICRA General Provisions—No Right to Counsel at Public Expense 
or Explicit Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel  
for Indian Defendants Sentenced to One Year or Less 
Under the general provisions of ICRA, a defendant in a tribal court 
proceeding has the right to assistance of counsel at his own expense.203 
Congress enacted ICRA in 1968, five years after Gideon established 
that the Sixth Amendment required trial courts to appoint counsel to 
indigents at public expense in felony cases, but before the Court con-
sidered whether the constitutional right to appointed counsel extended 
to misdemeanor prosecutions. Against this backdrop, by explicitly 
stating that tribal courts may not deny a defendant counsel retained at 
 
201. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b). 
202. Id. § 1304(d) (Supp. I 2013–2014). 
203. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6) provides: “No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-
government shall . . . deny to any person in a criminal proceeding . . . at his 
own expense to have the assistance of counsel for his defense (except as 
provided in subsection (b) [sic—‘c’]).” However, the reference to “subsection 
(b)” in 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6) appears to be a typo. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302 (b)–(c) 
were added after the enactment of TLOA; 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b) is an enhanced 
sentencing provision, while § 1302(c) covers the procedural protections 
(including the right to counsel at public expense for indigents) that a tribal 
court seeking to exercise the enhanced sentencing powers described in § 
1302(b) must provide. See also Barbara L. Creel, The Right to Counsel for 
Indians Accused of Crime: A Tribal and Congressional Imperative, 18 Mich. 
J. Race & L. 317, 340 (2013) (noting that until 1961, the Code of Federal 
Regulations prohibited attorneys in tribal court) (citing 25 C.F.R. § 11.9 
(1958) (repealed by 26 Fed. Reg. 4360–61 (May 19, 1961)). 
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his own expense, Congress excluded tribal courts from a Gideon-like 
requirement to provide appointed counsel to indigent defendants.204 
As a practical matter, this limitation did not result in a different 
right to counsel at public expense in tribal courts. As enacted in 1968, 
ICRA limited the punishment a tribal court could impose to 
misdemeanor-type penalties—a maximum of six months imprisonment 
and/or a $500 fine.205 In 1968, Gideon was understood to apply only in 
felony cases. Thus, when Congress enacted ICRA and did not provide 
for counsel at tribal expense, indigent state court defendants did not 
have a constitutional right to counsel at public expense outside the 
felony context. As a result, indigent tribal court defendants, at this time 
limited to Indians,206 were in no different position than indigent state 
defendants as a matter of federal law under ICRA.207 
 
204. United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769, 778 (6th Cir. 1997) (“ICRA provides 
for a right to counsel, but does not extend that right to the limits of the 
Sixth Amendment. . . . Thus, the tribes are not required to provide counsel 
to the indigent accused in felony prosecutions, despite the Sixth Amendment 
holding to the contrary in Gideon . . . .” (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963), abrogated on other grounds by Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 
(2001))). 
205. As enacted, ICRA provided: “No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-
government shall . . . impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or 
punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of six months or a fine of 
$500, or both[.]” 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1976). Congress amended ICRA in 1986 
to increase the maximum sentence to one year of imprisonment and a $5,000 
fine. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570 § 4217, 100 Stat. 3207–
146. Following enactment of TLOA in 2010, section (a)(7) was revised to raise 
the one year incarceration cap for each offense to three and the $5,000 fine cap 
to $15,000, and to allow tribal courts to stack offenses to impose a term of 
incarceration of up to nine years for some offenses in proceedings complying 
with TLOA’s procedural requirements, including the provision of bar-licensed 
counsel at public expense. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(B)–(D) (2012). These ICRA 
provisions currently read: “No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-
government shall . . . (B) except as provided in subparagraph (C), impose for 
conviction of any 1 offense any penalty or punishment greater than 
imprisonment for a term of 1 year or a fine of $5,000, or both; (C) subject to 
subsection (b) [providing for enhanced penalties in specific cases], impose for 
conviction of any 1 offense any penalty or punishment greater than 
imprisonment for a term of 3 years or a fine of $15,000, or both; or (D) impose 
on a person in a criminal proceeding a total penalty or punishment greater 
than imprisonment for a term of 9 years.” Id. § 1302(a)(7)(B)–(D) (2012) 
(TLOA amendments in italics). 
206. Under the 1968 version of ICRA, this provision applied only to Indians 
since, as noted, tribal courts were completely divested of jurisdiction over 
non-Indians until VAWA 2013 restored tribal court jurisdiction over some 
non-Indians under limited circumstances. 
207. Creel, supra note 203, at 347 (“While the debate regarding tribal members’ 
right to counsel under the ICRA ensued, the indigent defendant’s right to 
counsel in state and federal court was still unfolding. Senator Ervin began 
his investigative hearings in 1961, before Gideon had been decided. During 
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After Congress enacted ICRA, the Argersinger line of cases erased 
the misdemeanor/felony distinction that developed following Gideon 
and extended the right to counsel at public expense to indigents in all 
criminal proceedings that result in either actual imprisonment, no 
matter how brief, or in a suspended sentence that includes a term of 
imprisonment. When Congress amended ICRA in 1986 it increased 
tribal court sentencing authority from six months imprisonment and a 
$500 fine, to one year imprisonment and a $5,000 fine. Although these 
amendments occurred after the Court decided Argersinger in 1972, 
ICRA’s right to counsel at public expense provisions were not revised 
to reflect the “actual imprisonment” trigger developed by the Court in 
the federal constitutional realm.  
Thus, under current law, the federal statutory right to counsel of 
indigent tribal court defendants subject to the general provisions of 
ICRA (i.e. non-TLOA and non-VAWA 2013 prosecutions and limited 
to Indians) remains unchanged. Unlike indigent state and federal court 
defendants who, since Argersinger and Scott, are entitled to counsel at 
public expense in any proceeding that results in actual imprisonment 
or a suspended sentence of imprisonment, indigent tribal court defen-
dants outside TLOA and VAWA 2013 have the right to the assistance 
of retained counsel only. As a result, an indigent Indian defendant in 
tribal court can be incarcerated for up to one year without appointment 
(or assistance) of counsel. It should be noted, this just describes the 
ICRA procedural floor—tribal courts, of course, can and do provide 
indigent defendants with advocates to assist them in defending against 
criminal prosecutions even though not mandated to do so by ICRA. 
C. TLOA—Right to Effective Assistance of Bar-Licensed Counsel at 
Public Expense for Indigent Indian Defendants  
Sentenced to More than One Year Incarceration 
Congress made a number of changes to ICRA and other statutes 
when it passed TLOA. The relevant changes for purposes of this Article 
are the amendments to ICRA that increased tribal court’s sentencing 
authority in specific cases from the one year/$5,000 sentencing cap to 
a three year/$15,000 cap for a single offense, and permit tribal courts 
 
the seven years of Senate [ICRA] hearings from 1961 and continuing after 
the passage of ICRA in 1968, the Supreme Court had not yet extended the 
right to counsel to defendants facing jail time for misdemeanor offenses. At 
that time, the Sixth Amendment guaranteed a criminal defendant the right 
to counsel in federal court, but that right was not made applicable to state 
court trials until 1963; even then, it was only for felonies, not misdemeanors. 
Thus, with regard to the right to counsel debate of the time, ICRA’s 
provision of a right to counsel at the Indian’s own expense was equivalent to 
the right to counsel in the states. Tribes were in synchronicity with the state 
and federal judicial interpretation of the late 1960s and early 1970s.”) 
(citations omitted).  
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to stack offenses to impose a total sentence of incarceration of up to 
nine years, but only if tribal courts extend defendant’s procedural 
protections above those required under the general provisions of ICRA. 
Specifically, to exercise the enhanced sentencing authority under the 
TLOA amendments to ICRA, a tribal court must: 
provide all defendants “the right to effective assistance of counsel 
at least equal to that guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution;”208 
provide indigent defendants “the assistance of a defense attorney 
licensed to practice law by any jurisdiction in the United States 
that applies appropriate professional licensing standards and 
effectively ensures the competence and professional responsibility 
of its licensed attorneys” at tribal expense;209 
supply a judge with “sufficient legal training to preside over 
criminal proceedings” who is licensed to practice law;210 
before charging a defendant, make the tribe’s “criminal laws 
(including regulations and interpretative documents), rules of 
evidence, and rules of criminal procedure (including rules 
governing the recusal of judges in appropriate circumstances)” 
publicly available;211 and  
“maintain a record of the criminal proceeding, including an audio 
or other recording of the trial proceeding.”212 
Thus, with respect to the right to counsel, the TLOA amendments 
to ICRA require tribal courts to provide all defendants with effective 
assistance of counsel, as defined by the Constitution, and to provide 
indigent defendants a licensed attorney at public expense before it im-
poses a sentence over the one year/$5,000 sentencing cap contained in 
the general provisions of ICRA. The language used in the TLOA 
amendments to ICRA to identify when an indigent tribal court 
defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel at tribal expense is 
triggered mirrors the Argersinger “actual incarceration” standard—
under the TLOA amendments to ICRA, the right to effective assistance 
 
208. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(1). The general provisions of ICRA provide for the right 
to assistance of counsel; they do not contain a right to effective assistance 
of counsel. Id. § 1302(a)(6). 
209. Id. § 1302(c)(2). The general provisions of ICRA do not require that counsel 
be bar-licensed. Id. § 1302(a).  
210. Id. §§ 1302(c)(3)(A)–(B). 
211. Id. § 1302(c)(4). 
212. Id. § 1302(c)(5). 
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of counsel and the right of indigent defendants to assistance of bar-
licensed counsel at public expense are triggered when a tribal court 
“imposes” a TLOA sentence: “In a criminal proceeding in which an 
Indian tribe, in exercising powers of self-government, imposes a total 
term of imprisonment of more than 1 year on a defendant, the Indian 
tribe shall [provide the enumerated protections imposed by TLOA].”213 
D. VAWA 2013—Right to Effective Assistance of Bar-Licensed 
Counsel at Public Expense if  
Incarceration of Any Length May be Imposed 
For the first time since the Congress divested tribal courts of 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, in VAWA 2013 it partially res-
tored tribal court criminal jurisdiction over particular non-Indians in a 
limited class of domestic violence offenses committed in Indian country, 
subject to certain requirements. VAWA 2013 authorized qualifying 
tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over some non-Indians who 
commit certain crimes in Indian country—to wit: “domestic violence[,] 
dating violence,” and “violations of protection orders” involving an 
Indian victim.214 However, for a tribe to exercise VAWA 2013 criminal 
jurisdiction over a non-Indian defendant, the defendant must have some 
connection to the tribe—such as working or living in the community; 
or being married to, or in an intimate or dating relationship with an 
Indian who is a member of the tribe, or with a non-member Indian 
living in the community.215 Indians are also subject to prosecution for 
domestic violence offenses enumerated in VAWA 2013. However, the 
primary aim of the “special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction”216 
created by VAWA was to authorize tribal courts to exercise jurisdiction 
 
213. Id. § 1302(c). 
214. Id. Tribal court jurisdiction under VAWA 2013 is limited to cases involving 
an Indian victim; thus, tribes cannot exercise jurisdiction over domestic 
violence offenses committed in Indian country if both the victim and 
defendant are non-Indians. Id. § 1304(b)(4)(A)(i). 
215. Id. § 1304(b)(4)(B). 
216. The VAWA 2013 amendments to ICRA are codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304 
(Supp. I 2013–2014). 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(1) describes the nature of tribal 
courts’ VAWA 2013 jurisdiction “to exercise special domestic violence 
criminal jurisdiction” as extending “over all persons” (that is, not just 
Indians): “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in addition to all 
powers of self-government recognized and affirmed by sections 1301 and 
1303 of this title, the powers of self-government of a participating tribe 
include the inherent power of that tribe, which is hereby recognized and 
affirmed, to exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over all 
persons.” 25 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(6) defines “special domestic violence criminal 
jurisdiction” as “the criminal jurisdiction that a participating tribe may 
exercise under this section but could not otherwise exercise.” 
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over non-Indians who commit domestic violence offenses against Indian 
victims in tribal communities. 
Congress enacted a new section under ICRA to implement and 
authorize tribal courts’ restored criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 
This new section imposes heightened procedural requirements on tribal 
courts seeking to exercise “special domestic violence criminal juris-
diction” under VAWA 2013. In exercising VAWA 2013 jurisdiction, 
tribal courts must provide defendants with all of the procedural pro-
tections required under the general provisions of ICRA (found in 25 
U.S.C. § 1302(a)). In addition, tribal courts must extend all the pro-
tections under the TLOA amendments to ICRA discussed above (found 
in 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)) to defendants if a term of imprisonment of any 
length may be imposed as a result of conviction. In contrast, in 
prosecutions outside of VAWA 2013—prosecutions limited to Indian 
defendants—tribal courts are only required to appoint counsel for 
indigent defendants on whom they impose a sentence greater than one 
year.217 
Tribal courts seeking to exercise VAWA 2013 jurisdiction must 
provide defendants with two additional rights guaranteed under the 
Constitution to state and federal defendants, but not found in either 
ICRA’s general provisions or the TLOA amendments to ICRA (which, 
as noted, only authorize prosecutions against Indian defendants). First, 
the right to an “impartial jury,” which Congress specifically defined for 
purposes of VAWA 2013 jurisdiction using the language the Supreme 
Court developed to define an impartial jury under the Constitution: a 
jury drawn from a “fair cross section of the community” using a 
 
217. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d) (Supp. I 2013-2014) sets the “Rights of defendants” in 
VAWA 2013 prosecutions in tribal courts, providing: “In a criminal 
proceeding in which a participating tribe exercises special domestic violence 
criminal jurisdiction, the participating tribe shall provide to the defendant—
(1) all applicable rights under this Act [i.e. the rights set out in the general 
provisions of ICRA found at 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)]; (2) if a term of 
imprisonment of any length may be imposed, all rights described in section 
1302(c) of this title [the TLOA amendments to ICRA]; (3) the right to a 
trial by an impartial jury that is drawn from sources that—(A) reflect a fair 
cross section of the community; and (B) do not systematically exclude any 
distinctive group in the community, including non-Indians; and (4) all other 
rights whose protection is necessary under the Constitution of the United 
States in order for Congress to recognize and affirm the inherent power of 
the participating tribe to exercise special domestic violence criminal 
jurisdiction over the defendant.” As discussed in Part III.C, the TLOA 
amendments to ICRA incorporated into the VAWA 2013 provisions of ICRA 
require tribal courts to provide all defendants the right to constitutionally 
effective assistance of counsel, and to provide indigent defendants licensed 
counsel at tribal expense; to provide a licensed and trained judges; to make 
tribal laws and rules publically available before prosecuting a defendant 
under VAWA 2013 provisions; and to ensure that VAWA 2013 are courts 
of record. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(3)–(5). 
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procedure that “do[es] not systematically exclude any distinctive group 
in the community;”218 and second, tribal courts must provide VAWA 
2013 defendants “all other rights whose protection is necessary under 
the Constitution . . . in order for Congress to recognize and affirm the 
inherent power of the participating tribe to exercise special domestic 
violence criminal jurisdiction. . . .”219 
Pertinent to the premise of this Article—that VAWA 2013 creates 
greater procedural benefits for the benefit of non-Indian tribal court 
defendants—the jury right under VAWA 2013, like the right to 
appointed counsel under VAWA 2013, is more expansive than that for 
Indian defendants and, in some instances, than that found in the Con-
stitution. Under the Constitution, state and federal defendants are en-
titled to a jury in prosecutions for felonies and non-petty offenses—
those punishable by six months or more incarceration—and they are 
entitled to an impartial jury. The general provisions of ICRA and the 
TLOA provisions—the ones that apply only to Indian defendants—
inter alia, require juries only in cases in which the tribal court imposes 
a sentence over one year imprisonment, and they contain no re-
quirement that the defendant’s jury be impartial. In contrast, VAWA 
2013 requires tribal courts to provide defendants with an impartial jury, 
which it defines by reference to the federal constitutional standard, if a 
term of imprisonment of any length may be imposed. Thus, a non-
VAWA 2013 tribal court defendant (limited to Indians) has a right to 
a jury only if the tribal court imposes a sentence over a year; a VAWA 
2013 tribal court defendant (which Congress anticipated to be non-
Indians) has a right to a constitutionally impartial jury if any length of 
imprisonment is authorized, whereas state and federal court defendants 
are entitled to a jury only if tried for an offense punishable by over six 
months imprisonment.220 
 
218. Id. § 1304(d)(3). 
219. Id. § 1304(d)(4). 
220. It appears that Congress may consider correcting this anomaly—on May 11, 
2016, Senators Barrasso and McCain introduced federal legislation that 
would, among other things, amend ICRA to make the jury right under both 
the general provisions and the VAWA 2013 provisions applicable to 
prosecutions for offenses punishable by six months or more. S. 2920, 114th 
Cong. § 108(a)–(b) (2016) (proposing to amend 25 U.S.C. 1302(a)(10) “by 
inserting ‘for 180 days or more’ after ‘punishable by imprisonment’” and to 
amend section 25 U.S.C. 1304(d)(3) “in the matter preceding subparagraph 
(A), by striking ‘the right’ and inserting ‘if a term of imprisonment of 180 
days or more may be imposed, the right’”). If successful, this amendment 
will put all tribal court defendants on equal footing with state and federal 
defendants by making the seriousness of the charged crime as determined by 
the relevant law makers (i.e. anything punishable by imprisonment of six 
months or more) the trigger for the right to trial by jury. See supra note 108 
and accompanying text. As of March 2017, this proposed legislation had been 
reported by Committee and placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar. 
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VAWA 2013 defendants are also entitled to the right to counsel as 
defined by the TLOA amendments to ICRA. TLOA specifies what type 
of assistance of counsel is required: effective assistance of bar-licensed 
counsel. And that right to counsel, as noted, is defined by reference to 
federal constitutional standards. However, with respect to identifying 
when a tribal court defendant’s right to counsel under ICRA attaches, 
there is an important difference between the TLOA provisions and the 
VAWA 2013 provisions. Under the TLOA amendments to ICRA, a 
tribal court must provide an indigent defendant counsel at public 
expense if it “imposes a total term of imprisonment of more than 1 year 
on a defendant.”221 The use of the word “imposes” mirrors the 
Argersinger “actual incarceration” standard that applies to state and 
federal court proceedings. Under this provision, therefore, even if a 
tribal court defendant is charged with an offense that authorizes 
incarceration over one year—that is, a felony-level offense—a tribal 
court can, presumably, opt to forgo providing an indigent defendant 
counsel at tribal expense as long as it does not actually sentence that 
defendant to a term of incarceration over one year. This is analogous 
to the Argersinger constitutional standard for misdemeanors under 
which a state trial court can deny an indigent defendant counsel at 
public expense even if that defendant is charged under a statute that 
authorizes incarceration, as long as it does not actually sentence that 
defendant to a term of incarceration or a suspended sentence of incar-
ceration. 
The VAWA 2013 appointed counsel provisions in ICRA are worded 
quite differently from the TLOA appointed counsel provisions. The 
VAWA 2013 provisions require a tribal court to provide “all rights 
described in section 1302(c)”—the TLOA provisions, which include the 
right to constitutionally effective assistance of counsel, and, for indigent 
defendants, the right to licensed counsel at tribal expense—“if a term 
of imprisonment of any length may be imposed . . . .”222 In providing 
for the right to counsel at public expense for a term of imprisonment of 
“any length,” the VAWA 2013 provisions—like the Argersinger 
standard, and unlike the TLOA provisions—do not distinguish between 
misdemeanor and felony length sentences as a factor for the 
appointment of counsel. Unlike the Argersinger actual imprisonment 
standard—which the TLOA provisions appear to mirror—the VAWA 
2013 provisions require tribal courts to appoint counsel to indigent 
tribal court defendants “if a term of imprisonment . . . may be imposed 
. . . .” The phrase “may be imposed” is conditional and it tracks the 
 
S.2920—Tribal Law and Order Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 
2016, congress.gov, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-
bill/2920/all-actions?overview=closed#tabs [https://perma.cc/3XDG-BDT7] 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2017). 
221. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.  
222. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(2) (Supp. I 2013–2014) (emphasis added). 
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“authorized incarceration” standard the Argersinger majority rejected 
in favor of the “actual incarceration” standard. Thus, VAWA 2013 
tribal court defendants—which Congress anticipated to be non-
Indians—are entitled to: (1) effective assistance of counsel at public 
expense if the tribal law under which they are charged authorizes any 
incarceration as a punishment; (2) an impartial jury (defined by refer-
ence to the Sixth Amendment standard) in any case in which impris-
onment is authorized; and (3) every other (unspecified) federal cons-
titutional right necessary for Congress to recognize and affirm its 
jurisdiction over non-Indians.223 
It seems apparent that Congress intended the VAWA 2013 
amendments to ICRA to ensure that non-Indian defendants subject to 
tribal criminal jurisdiction would not be procedurally disadvantaged by 
being tried in tribal court, rather than state or federal court (where 
they would otherwise be prosecuted) for domestic violence offenses 
committed against Indians in Indian country.224 But with respect to the 
right to counsel at public expense, Congress overshot the mark. Whe-
ther intentionally or inadvertently, under the VAWA 2013 provisions 
of ICRA, indigent non-Indian tribal court defendants have a more ro-
bust right to counsel at public expense than other tribal court defen-
dants (namely, Indians) and even state and federal court indigent defen-
dants under the Constitution.225 
IV. Interpreting ICRA’s Right to Counsel Provisions—
Does ICRA Impose a Higher Appointed Counsel 
Obligation on Tribal Courts Than  
the Constitution Places on State Courts? 
There is little case law interpreting the criminal procedural re-
quirements of ICRA specifically.226 However, courts that have con-
sidered the question have concluded that Congress did not intend for 
ICRA to be generally co-extensive with the Constitution.227 Where the 
 
223. See supra note 217.  
224. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
225. See United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1960 n.4 (2016) (noting that the 
VAWA 2013 amendments to ICRA grant an “unqualified right of an indigent 
defendant to appointed counsel” but “express[ed] no view on the validity of 
those provisions”); United States v. Flett, No. CR-12-132-FVS-1, 2013 WL 
1742269, at *2 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 23, 2013) (noting that an Indian defendant 
raised a federal equal protection challenge to this statutory discrepancy and 
that the district court rejected the challenge with little analysis).  
226. United States v. Swift Hawk, 125 F. Supp. 2d 384, 387 (D.S.D. 2000) 
(observing that “[t]here is almost no case law on the ICRA”). 
227. Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 682 (10th Cir. 1971) (noting that ICRA’s 
legislative history “makes it clear that Congress intended that the provisions 
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text of an ICRA provision tracks the language of a Constitutional 
counterpart, however, some courts have found ICRA is co-extensive 
with the Constitution and looked to federal decisional law to interpret 
it.228 But similarity in textual language alone is an insufficient basis for 
concluding that a statutory provision should be interpreted co-
extensively with the Constitution.229 With respect to the VAWA 2013 
amendments to ICRA, it is not clear whether Congress intended them 
to be co-extensive with their constitutional counterparts and whether 
 
of the Fifteenth Amendment, certain procedural provisions of the Fifth, 
Sixth, and Seventh Amendments, and in some respects the equal protection 
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment should not be embraced in the 
Indian Bill of Rights”); White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311, 1313 
(8th Cir. 1973) (“The particular clause of the Act before us requiring 
interpretation, as we have noted, is the equal protection clause. Appellant is 
correct in arguing that it does not here embrace in entirety all of its content 
in our applicable constitutional law. Thus we note that the Congressional 
hearings elicited information concerning practices of tribal governments at 
variance with the Anglo-American tradition.”). But see Means v. Navajo 
Nation, 432 F.3d 924, 935 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Although the U.S. Constitution 
does not bind the Navajo tribe in the exercise of its own sovereign powers, 
[ICRA] confers all the criminal protections on Means that he would receive 
under the Federal Constitution, except for right to grand jury indictment 
and right to appointed counsel if he cannot afford an attorney.”). 
228. See 19 John J. Dvorske et al., Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 46:989 (2016) (“In 
light of the legislative history and the striking similarity between the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and the governing provision 
of the Act, constitutional standards govern the conduct of tribal officials in 
making an arrest on an Indian reservation and in making a search pursuant 
to the arrest.” (citing United States v. Clifford, 664 F.2d 1090, 1091–92 n.3 
(8th Cir. 1981) (“In light of the legislative history of the Indian Civil Rights 
Act and the similarity between § 1302(2) and the Constitution, this court 
has determined that fourth amendment standards govern the conduct of 
tribal officials.”) (citation omitted))); United States v. Lester, 647 F.2d 869, 
872 (8th Cir. 1981) (“In light of the legislative history of the Indian Civil 
Rights Act and its striking similarity to the language of the Constitution . . 
. we consider the problem before us under fourth amendment standards.” 
(citation omitted)). See also People v. Ramirez, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 631, 638 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that whether Congress intended the 
exclusionary rule—as opposed to the Fourth Amendment itself—to be 
incorporated into ICRA as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations was 
a question of first impression). 
229. United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769, 779 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Absent the 
Gideon qualifier, § 1302(6) substantially tracks the language of the Sixth 
Amendment, and it could fairly be argued that, outside of the context of the 
right to appointed counsel, Congress intended Indian tribes to be subject to 
the full scope of Sixth Amendment law . . . . However, the mere fact that a 
statute’s language is similar to that found in the Constitution has never been 
considered to be conclusive proof that Congress intended the statute to have 
the same meaning as the Constitutional provision.” (citing Verlinden B.V. v. 
Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 494–95 (1983) (emphasis in original), 
abrogated on other grounds by Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001))).  
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federal courts should, therefore, rely on federal Sixth Amendment juris-
prudence to delineate the rights of VAWA 2013 defendants on review.230 
By tying a tribe’s ability to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians to its adoption of procedural protections that mimic the Con-
stitution, Congress has explicitly identified constitutional criminal pro-
cedure as a limitation on tribal court sovereignty. Thus, the recent 
amendments to ICRA could be read as be procedural equalizers as 
among tribal, state and federal courts. However, by providing for more 
protection to VAWA 2013 defendants vis-à-vis other tribal court 
defendants generally—and in some instances, extending greater pro-
cedural protections to VAWA 2013 defendants than required in state 
or federal court by the Constitution—this suggests that the rights of 
Indians and non-Indians are based on their respective tribal and state 
citizenship, not generally on their federal citizenship. 
This matters because it will inform how courts interpret ICRA in 
reviewing tribal court convictions. As explained below, in the context 
of ICRA’s right to appointed counsel provisions, this is more than an 
academic exercise. It is a question whose resolution has direct and 
quantifiable impacts on the scope of criminal procedural protection 
available to tribal court defendants. And in the context of the right to 
counsel at tribal expense, as has been the case in state courts, this has 
direct and potentially significant impacts on tribal resources. 
A. Right to Counsel Independent of the Sixth Amendment 
As noted, ICRA requires tribes to provide a defendant counsel at 
tribal expense whenever a tribal court is exercising VAWA 2013 
jurisdiction and a sentence of incarceration may be imposed. As dis-
cussed, federal constitutional law and other parts of ICRA look to the 
actual incarceration, rather than the authorized penalty, to determine 
when a trial court must appoint counsel to indigent defendants. Fur-
ther, the non-VAWA 2013 provisions of ICRA only require tribal courts 
 
230. Doherty, 126 F.3d at 779–80 (“There is a paucity of case law under ICRA. 
. . . [h]owever, those courts that have considered ICRA have held that 
constitutional law precedents applicable to the federal and state governments 
do not necessarily apply ‘jot-for-jot’ to the tribes.” (citing Tom v. Sutton, 
533 F.2d 1101, 1104–05 (9th Cir. 1976) (noting that the right to due process 
under ICRA does not require appointment of counsel for indigent 
defendants))); Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 
F.2d 1079, 1081 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding the ICRA does not incorporate the 
Twenty–Sixth Amendment’s requirement that eighteen-year-olds be afforded 
the right to vote); Groundhog, 442 F.2d at 678 (concluding that although 
there is a right to due process under ICRA, this right does not establish the 
same rights as the federal constitution absent a specific congressional 
enactment). In Bryant, the Supreme Court observed that the right to 
appointed counsel under ICRA for Indian defendants “is not coextensive 
with the Sixth Amendment right” because in tribal court, unlike federal or 
state court, “a sentence of imprisonment up to one year may be imposed 
without according indigent defendants the right to appointed counsel.” 136 
S. Ct. at 1962 (2016). 
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to appoint counsel to indigent Indian defendants in cases where it 
imposes a sentence of imprisonment over a year, whereas the Con-
stitution requires state trial courts to appoint counsel before a term of 
imprisonment of any length is imposed. The use of a standard to trigger 
a tribal court’s duty to appoint counsel under VAWA 2013 different 
from the constitutional standard suggests ICRA’s right to appointed 
counsel provision should be interpreted independently of the Sixth 
Amendment. The result, however, in the context of the right to counsel 
at tribal expense, is that tribal courts may be required to carry a heavier 
fiscal burden than state courts in order to invoke VAWA 2013 juris-
diction because tribal courts, under this reading, must provide appoint-
ed counsel to all VAWA 2013 defendants, even those who do not receive 
a sentence of incarceration, not just defendants who are actually incar-
cerated. 
Arguably, different treatment of tribal courts under ICRA vis-à-vis 
state courts under the Constitution is defensible on two grounds. First, 
it is consistent with the treatment of tribes as separate sovereigns not 
subject to the Constitution. Thus, it could be argued, there is no struc-
tural political reason why a statutory floor imposed on tribal courts 
under ICRA should necessarily be the same as the constitutional floor 
imposed on states. It is entirely consistent with a citizenship-based 
notion of rights in defining the relationship of tribes to Indians, on one 
hand, and non-Indians, on the other. Consistent with this, one could 
argue that as a separate sovereign with trust authority over tribal 
nations, the federal government has an overriding interest in protecting 
federal non-Indian citizens over whom it has authorized a tribal court 
to exercise criminal jurisdiction.231 This could be viewed as a citizenship-
based portable notion of procedural rights under which defendants not 
 
231. The notion of portable citizenship-based rights is one I have explored in the 
context of state citizens tried in federal court for concurrent jurisdiction 
crimes. Jordan Gross, The Upside Down Mississippi Problem: Addressing 
Procedural Disparity Between Federal and State Criminal Defendants in 
Concurrent Jurisdiction Prosecutions, 38 Hamline L. Rev. 1 (2015). In 
that context, I submit that state citizens being tried in federal court for 
crimes over which a state could also exercise jurisdiction (i.e. concurrent 
jurisdiction offenses) should be entitled to the same level of procedural 
protection they would enjoy if tried in state court because of the states’ 
superior interest in prosecuting and punishing crimes that have primarily or 
exclusively local impacts—which describes most state/federal concurrent 
jurisdiction crimes. Id. 29–30 (“Where a federal defendant is prosecuted for 
conduct over which a state also has criminal jurisdiction this may result in 
an indefensible procedural disparity in a federal system that purports to defer 
to the supremacy of the states in matters of distinctly local concern. Ignoring 
this procedural disparity undermines federalism, unjustifiably disadvantages 
persons over whom the state has a superior claim to bring to justice, and 
encourages forum shopping, all with no discernable benefit to either the 
federal or the state criminal justice systems.”). 
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otherwise subject to tribal court jurisdiction (i.e. non-Indians) are en-
titled to all the procedural protections they would receive if they were 
tried in federal or state court for the same offense.232 
If VAWA 2013’s right to appointed counsel provisions are con-
strued independently of the Sixth Amendment, then, unlike state 
courts, tribal courts cannot avoid the added expense of providing cou-
nsel at public expense to VAWA 2013 defendants by deciding before-
hand to forgo incarceration as a punishment.233 The only way for a tribe 
to avoid this expense is to forgo altogether prosecution of domestic 
violence offenses committed by indigent234 non-Indians on its reser-
vation. So construing the VAWA 2013 right to appointed counsel pro-
visions is unsatisfying as a matter of constitutional and statutory anal-
ysis for a number of reasons. Putting tribes to this all-or-nothing choice, 
when states are not forced to make the same trade-off, undermines the 
entire Argersinger right to counsel at public expense rationale, which 
ties the federal constitutional right to the defendant’s liberty interest. 
Further, and more importantly from a practical standpoint, requiring 
tribal courts to forgo all prosecutions of non-Indian defendants for do-
mestic violence offenses committed on tribal land under statutes that 
authorize a term of incarceration undermines Congress’ intent in pass-
 
232. The analogy ends there, however. Unlike a state’s superior interest in a 
concurrent state/federal jurisdiction crime, arguably stemming from the 
local impact of the criminal conduct, the federal government cannot claim 
a superior interest in the prosecution and punishment of on-reservation 
crimes of domestic violence, crimes of particularly local impact. 
233. Tribal exercise of VAWA 2013 jurisdiction is optional. Thus, tribal courts 
can avoid this additional burden by forgoing jurisdiction over non-Indians. 
See 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(2)–(3) (Supp. I 2013–2014) (reiterating that 
affording tribal courts with power to prosecute limited domestic violence 
offenses does not impair the concurrent jurisdiction of state or federal 
authorities). To the extent VAWA 2013 usurps tribal sovereignty and self-
determination by requiring tribal courts to provide non-Indian defendants 
with greater protections than Indian defendants, this limitation and its 
attendant fiscal burden is voluntarily self-imposed. This is not unlike states, 
which can avoid the financial costs of providing counsel at public expense to 
indigents by forgoing incarceration as an option under the Argersinger actual 
incarceration standard. See supra notes 110–114. 
234. As under the Constitution, the right to counsel at public expense, of course, 
is available only to defendants who can establish indigency. See supra notes 
1–2, 12. Thus, as a technical matter, tribes could still prosecute non-Indian 
VAWA 2013 defendants who do not qualify for appointed counsel, or 
indigents who validly waive the right to counsel at tribal expense. See 25 
U.S.C. § 1302(c)(1)–(2) (2012) (discussing the rights of a defendant in tribal 
court).  
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ing VAWA 2013 because it limits, rather than expands, tribal juris-
diction over crimes of domestic violence committed by non-Indians in 
Indian country.235 
B. Co-extensive with the Sixth Amendment 
The alternative is to construe ICRA’s VAWA 2013 right to appoin-
ted counsel provisions co-extensively with the Sixth Amendment. In 
other words, construing the indigent VAWA 2013 defendant’s right to 
counsel the same as an indigent state and federal court defendant’s 
constitutional right to counsel—i.e. a right to counsel at public expense 
triggered by the actual imposition of a term of incarceration or a condi-
tional sentence of incarceration. This construction would allow tribal 
courts to exercise jurisdiction over qualifying indigent non-Indian dom-
estic violence offenders without providing counsel at tribal expense in 
all cases, just like state courts. Like a state trial court, a tribe could 
prosecute and punish this conduct with penalties other than incar-
ceration without providing counsel at tribal expense. This creates space 
for more expansive tribal court jurisdiction over domestic violence 
offenses committed on tribal land, one of VAWA 2013’s stated aims. 
And it bolsters tribal sovereignty by recognizing tribal authority to 
prosecute qualifying non-Indians and impose alternative punishments 
short of incarceration without incurring the fiscal burden of providing 
counsel at tribal expense in every case, an approach that could be more 
compatible with a traditional, non-adversarial approach to criminal 
justice.236 
The strongest argument for construing ICRA’s VAWA 2013 
amendments co-extensively with the Constitution is Congress’ clear in-
tent to import all of the constitutional criminal procedural rights 
afforded to state and federal court defendants into tribal court VAWA 
2013 prosecutions. As noted, Congress granted VAWA 2013 tribal court 
defendants impartial jury rights that track Sixth Amendment juris-
prudence. Congress codified the Sixth Amendment right to effective 
 
235. See Jodi Gillette & Charlie Galbraith, President Signs 2013 VAWA—
Empowering Tribes to Protect Native Women, White House Blog (Mar. 
7, 2013, 7:07 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/03/07/president-
signs-2013-vawa-empowering-tribes-protect-native-women [https://perma.cc/ 
845Y-LHTJ] (describing the goals of VAWA 2013 pertaining to enhanced 
provisions for tribal jurisdiction). Similarly, among Congress’ stated goals in 
enacting the TLOA were “to empower tribal governments with the 
authority, resources, and information necessary to safely and effectively 
provide public safety in Indian country [and] to reduce the prevalence of 
violent crime in Indian country and to combat sexual and domestic violence 
against American Indian and Alaska Native women[.]” Pub. L. No. 111-211 
§ 202(b)(3)–(4), 124 Stat. 2258, 2263 (2010). 
236. Creel, supra note 203, at 356 (“Tribal sovereign authority was undercut 
and truncated with the implementation of the adversarial court . . . .”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 2·2016 
VAWA 2013's Right to Appointed Counsel in Tribal Court Proceedings 
435 
assistance of counsel in the TLOA amendments to ICRA, and later 
incorporated those by reference into the VAWA 2013 amendments. 
And, to the extent anything was missed, Congress included a catch-all 
residual provision in the VAWA 2013 amendments to ICRA extending 
to VAWA 2013 tribal court defendants “all other rights whose pro-
tection is necessary under the Constitution of the United States in order 
for Congress to recognize and affirm the inherent power of the par-
ticipating tribe to exercise special domestic violence criminal juris-
diction over the defendant.”237 
These provisions, considered together, support a compelling argu-
ment that Congress intended to constitutionalize VAWA 2013’s base-
line procedural protections. But it does not necessarily mean Congress 
did not also intend to confer VAWA 2013 tribal court defendants with 
more procedural protection than required by the Constitution in state 
and federal prosecutions, as it appears to have done with the right to 
counsel at public expense provisions in ICRA.238 Under a plain reading 
of ICRA, indigent tribal court defendants in non-VAWA 2013 
prosecutions, which can only be Indians, are entitled to counsel at tribal 
expense only if a sentence over one year is actually imposed. This is less 
than what is required in state or federal court under the Constitution, 
where an indigent defendant must receive counsel at public expense 
before he can be sentenced to any term of incarceration, no matter how 
brief. In contrast, the VAWA 2013 amendments to ICRA—which were 
clearly intended to benefit and protect non-Indian tribal court 
defendants—require appointment of counsel at tribal expense when any 
term of incarceration may be imposed.  
Conclusion 
If ICRA’s statutory language is plain, whether the discrepancies 
between ICRA’s right to appointed counsel provisions and the federal 
constitutional right are due to Congressional oversight or intent is 
immaterial.239 A plain language reading of ICRA, under which indigent 
 
237. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(4) (Supp. I 2013–2014). 
238. See, e.g., Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 
(1991) (“Congress is understood to legislate against a background of common-
law . . . principles. Thus, where a common-law principle is well established . 
. . the courts may take it as given that Congress has legislated with an 
expectation that the principle will apply except ‘when a statutory purpose to 
the contrary is evident.’” (citations omitted)); United States v. Texas, 507 
U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (noting that where a common law principle is established, 
“Congress does not write upon a clean slate” (citation omitted)). 
239. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009) (“As with any 
question of statutory interpretation, our analysis begins with the plain 
language of the statute. It is well established that, when the statutory 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 2·2016 
VAWA 2013's Right to Appointed Counsel in Tribal Court Proceedings 
436 
VAWA 2013 tribal court defendants are entitled to appointed counsel 
where their Indian tribal court, and state and federal court counter-
parts, are not, is unsettling and unsatisfying. It limits tribal options for 
prosecuting non-Indians who commit domestic violence offenses on 
tribal land by imposing an additional cost on every VAWA 2013 prose-
cution. Ultimately, this can lead to reduced safety for reservation resi-
dents if a tribal government forgoes VAWA 2013 prosecutions because 
it cannot absorb this additional cost. It also makes it hard to escape a 
conclusion that Congress created a broader right to appointed counsel 
in tribal courts for the benefit of non-Indian defendants out of fear that 
tribal courts would not deal fairly or competently with indigent non-
Indian defendants. This reflects an unstated premise that the tribal 
court justice reached without the involvement of counsel is a lesser 
justice. Given that this is a constitutional assumption the Supreme 
Court has never made about state court misdemeanor proceedings, 
Congress should at least substantiate any assumption it has made in 
mandating differential and preferential treatment of non-Indian tribal 
court defendants. Better yet, rather than leaving tribes with yet another 
bitter jurisdictional pill to swallow, Congress should amend ICRA to 
eliminate the procedural imbalance it has created between Indian and 
non-Indian tribal court defendants by either: (1) extending the VAWA 
2013 right to appointed counsel to all tribal court defendants (and 
funding it); or (2) tethering the right to appointed counsel for all tribal 
court defendants to the Sixth Amendment.  
 
language is plain, we must enforce it according to its terms.” (citations 
omitted)). 
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9-0 on case-by-case approach; 8-1 on application of test 
to case 
 
MAJORITY 
&Byron R. 
White 
 
<Thurgood 
Marshall 
 
<Harry A. 
Blackmun 
 
<Warren E. 
Burger 
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+William J. 
Brennan, Jr. 
 
+Potter 
Stewart 
 
<Lewis F. 
Powell, Jr. 
Parole/probation revocation hearing not a stage of 
criminal prosecution. Departing from Gideon and 
Argersinger categorical approach, in parole/probation 
revocation context, right to appointed counsel 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis 
<William 
H. 
Rehnquist 
 
DISSENTING IN PART 
~William O. 
Douglas 
Due process required appointment of counsel under 
circumstances of case 
 
@Scott v. Illinois (1979) 
Actual incarceration v. authorized incarceration as 
trigger in state prosecutions 
5-4 on actual v. authorized incarceration as sole 
trigger; 8-1 on whether categorical rule is appropriate 
standard 
 
MAJORITY 
<Warren 
E. Burger 
 
+Potter 
Stewart 
 
&Byron R. 
White 
 
<William 
H. 
Rehnquist 
Argersinger limited the constitutional right to 
appointed counsel in state misdemeanor proceedings to 
cases involving actual imprisonment 
CONCURRING 
<Lewis F. 
Powell, Jr.  
Reiterated disagreement with Argersinger categorical 
approach; cases involving sentences other than 
incarceration can have equally serious consequences, 
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but are outside rule; rule impairs proper functioning of 
criminal justice system by forcing trial judges to 
evaluate punishment before knowing anything about 
case; preserving incarceration option by providing 
counsel often impossible or impracticable. Joined 
Court’s opinion despite continuing reservations about 
Argersinger rule because approved by Court in 1972 
and four Justices now reaffirming—“mindful of stare 
decisis, I join the opinion of the Court. I do so, 
however, with the hope that in due time a majority 
will recognize that a more flexible rule is consistent 
with due process and will better serve the cause of 
justice.” 
DISSENTING 
+William 
J. Brennan, 
Jr. 
Argersinger established “two dimensional” test for the 
right to counsel—attaches to any “nonpetty” offense 
punishable by more than six months in jail and to any 
offense where actual incarceration is likely regardless 
of the maximum authorized penalty. Scott’s offense 
was not petty and thus he was entitled to appointed 
counsel under Argersinger. Further, the 6th and 14th 
A require appointment of counsel in prosecution where 
imprisonment for any length time is authorized.  
<Thurgood 
Marshall 
Joined Brennan dissent 
@John 
Paul 
Stevens 
Joined Brennan dissent 
<Harry A. 
Blackmun 
Right to counsel extends at least as far as right to jury 
trial; would hold that an indigent defendant in a state 
criminal case must be afforded appointed counsel 
whenever defendant is prosecuted for a nonpetty 
criminal offense (one punishable by more than six 
months’ imprisonment) or whenever defendant is 
convicted of an offense and is actually subjected to any 
term of imprisonment 
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%Alabama v. Shelton (2002) 
Imposition of suspended sentence of incarceration for 
uncounseled offense 
5-4 
 
MAJORITY 
@John Paul 
Stevens  
 
%Sandra Day 
O’Connor 
 
%David H. 
Souter 
 
%Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg 
Suspended sentence that may result in incarceration 
of any length may not be imposed unless counsel 
appointed at time suspended sentence imposed 
%Stephen G. 
Breyer 
 
DISSENTING 
%Antonin 
Scalia 
Central premise of Argersinger is that actual 
imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from 
fines or the mere threat of imprisonment; extends 
the misdemeanor right to counsel to cases bearing 
the mere threat of imprisonment 
%Anthony M. 
Kennedy 
 
<William H. 
Rehnquist 
 
%Clarence 
Thomas 
 
 
 
